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Piercing the (Sovereign) Veil: The Role of Limited
Liability in State-Owned Enterprises
W. Mark C. Weidemaier*
Sovereign nations own more than ten percent of the world’s
largest firms and use these ownership stakes to pursue economic,
social, and political objectives unrelated to profit maximization.
Sovereign nations also have unique powers and attributes that
“ordinary” owners lack. Sovereigns do not need an owner’s
control rights to direct entity behavior; they have the power to
regulate. Sovereigns do not need an owner’s economic rights to
extract value; they have the power to tax. And sovereigns do not
need to hide behind the principle of limited liability, which protects
owners of limited liability entities; they have sovereign immunity
in both domestic and foreign courts.
Despite these fundamental differences, neither courts nor
legal scholars have seriously examined whether organizational
law should distinguish sovereigns from other owners. This Article
takes up that question, focusing on the law of veil piercing as
applied to corporations and other limited liability entities owned
by sovereign states. Its first contribution is to demonstrate that
the principle of limited liability does different work for sovereign
states than for ordinary shareholders. That principle’s primary
function is to create a partition between the owner’s assets and
those belonging to the entity. Because the partition yields
important economic benefits, veil piercing is reserved for
exceptional cases. But foreign states do not need organizational
law to realize these benefits. The law of foreign sovereign
immunity already protects the state’s assets in ways that mimic
the protections of organizational law. By contrast, state-owned
entities rely on organizational law for asset protection.
* Ralph M. Stockton Jr. Distinguished Professor, University of North Carolina
School of Law. For comments on prior drafts, thanks to Martin Brinkley, John Conley, John
Coyle, Tom Hazen, Mitu Gulati, Eisha Jain, Kim Krawiec, Rich Saver, Richard Squire,
Deborah Weissman, and to participants at workshops and conferences at Brooklyn Law
School, Duke Law School, the University of North Carolina School of Law, and Vanderbilt
University School of Law. Thanks as well to Matt Gauthier for research assistance.
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Put differently, in the sovereign context, organizational law
mostly protects entities.
In the United States, the law of veil piercing in this context
derives from the Supreme Court’s seminal Bancec case. The
Article’s second contribution is to demonstrate that Bancec
supports its clarified understanding of the relevance of
organizational law. Indeed, Bancec was a reverse veil piercing
case in which a creditor of a foreign state asserted a claim against
a state-owned firm. Bancec’s emphasis on the traditional assetprotective function of organizational law must be understood in
that context. Bancec does not stand for the proposition that
foreign states should receive the same protections as ordinary
shareholders. The Article closes by exploring implications of this
analysis. Perhaps the most important (if counter-intuitive)
implication is that courts should be more receptive to traditional
veil piercing claims, at least in a subset of cases.
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INTRODUCTION
When should the law respect the separate legal status of
corporations or other limited liability entities owned by foreign
governments? To use a prominent contemporary example, the
Venezuelan economy was in free-fall even before the onset of the
Covid-19 pandemic. The government and its state-owned oil
company, Pétroleos de Venezuela (PDVSA), are mired in debt and
in the crosshairs of creditors.1 Should courts in the United States
and elsewhere let one entity’s disappointed creditors attach assets
owned by the other?2 The question implicates familiar principles of
organizational law. The defining feature of the modern limited
liability entity is that it creates a partition between assets belonging
to the entity and assets belonging to owners.3 Shareholders are not
usually liable for corporate debts,4 nor must a corporation typically
answer to its owners’ creditors.5 These features of corporate law are
so well-known they are often reduced to metaphor. Corporations,
we say, are separate legal persons.6
Nothing about the metaphor implies that the owner’s identity
will affect the corporation’s treatment. And in fact, courts also
1. Andrew Scurria, Venezuela Creditor Cleared to Resume Citgo Seizure Efforts, WALL ST.
J. (Sept. 30, 2019, 3:59 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/venezuela-creditor-cleared-toresume-citgo-seizure-efforts-11569865813?st=x4p29kfsglpyo43; Caroline Simson, U.S. Urges
Del. Judge to Pause Crystallex’s Bid for Citgo, LAW360 (Aug. 31, 2020, 5:59 PM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/1305785/us-urges-del-judge-to-pause-crystallex-s-bidfor-citgo; Clifford Krauss, Venezuela’s Crisis Imperils CITGO, Its American ‘Cash Cow’,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/01/business/energyenvironment/venezuela-citgo-oil-sanctions.html?searchResultPosition=1.
2. For example, a creditor of the Venezuelan government holding $1.4 billion
judgment resulting from an arbitration award recently attached PDVSA’s equity interest in
the ultimate U.S. parent company of CITGO petroleum. Krauss, supra note 1.
3. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law,
110 YALE L.J. 387, 390 (2000).
4. See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.22 (2016); Janet Cooper Alexander, Unlimited
Shareholder Liability Through a Procedural Lens, 106 HARV. L. REV. 387, 390 (1992).
5. STEPHEN B. PRESSER, PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL § 1:1 (2016). Incorporation also
protects corporate assets from some claims by shareholders, including attempts to recover
an investment by forcing a liquidation or dissolution of the corporation. Margaret M. Blair,
Locking in Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for Business Organizers in the Nineteenth
Century, 51 UCLA L. REV. 387, 392 (2003). This is not to say that the presumption is equally
firm in all cases.
6. Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd. v. King, 533 U.S. 158, 163 (2001); Riverdale
Cotton Mills v. Ala. & Ga. Mfg. Co., 198 U.S. 188, 199 (1905); see also Jonathan Macey & Joshua
Mitts, Finding Order in the Morass: The Three Real Justifications for Piercing the Corporate Veil,
100 CORNELL L. REV. 99, 100 (2014).
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respect the separate legal status of corporations owned by foreign
sovereigns.7 But it is less obvious why this should be so. Sovereign
states do not need organizational law as much, or in the same ways,
as other owners.8 Despite this, the law often draws no distinction
between state-owned and other corporations. For example, when
deciding whether to pierce the corporate veil of a corporation
owned by a foreign sovereign—thus letting the corporation’s
creditors reach state assets, and potentially vice versa—courts in
the United States apply familiar corporate law rules without asking
whether this makes sense in context.
This Article examines the law of veil piercing as applied to
corporations and other limited liability entities owned by sovereign
states. I focus on foreign sovereigns—that is, entities recognized as
states under international law, challenged in the courts of another
such state or before an international tribunal.9 Veil piercing is
among the most important de-partitioning remedies under U.S. law
and can have enormous practical consequences.10 To return to the
Venezuelan context, the government and PDVSA separately owe
over $200 billion, which they cannot pay, and have already
defaulted on much of the debt. This mountain of debt will prove
hard to restructure—among other reasons, because there is no
bankruptcy mechanism allowing sovereign states to impose
restructuring terms on a dissenting creditor minority.11 The
prospects for successful restructuring will dim further if courts do
not respect the boundary between the government and its oil
company.12 In fact, courts already have disregarded that boundary,
7. See, e.g., First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba,
462 U.S. 611, 625 (1983).
8. See infra Section I.B.
9. Similar arguments could be made, of course, with regard to other types of
sovereign-owned entities. In the U.S. context, this might include entities controlled by state
or tribal governments.
10. Henry Hansmann & Richard Squire, External and Internal Asset Partitioning:
Corporations and Their Subsidiaries, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW AND
GOVERNANCE (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Wolf-Georg Ringe eds., 2018).
11. Steven L. Schwarcz, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Bankruptcy Reorganization
Approach, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 956 (1999).
12. The reasons are complicated but stem from the fact that creditors who successfully
pierce the corporate veil have less reason to fear contract-based restructuring mechanisms.
For example, many of Venezuela’s loan contracts have so-called collective action clauses,
which let the government impose restructuring terms on dissenting creditors if a creditor
majority approves a restructuring plan. But PDVSA’s creditors did not assent to these
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allowing a creditor of the government to attach PDVSA’s
ownership stake in U.S. oil refiner CITGO Petroleum.13
One cannot have a principled veil piercing doctrine without
understanding why the corporate form matters in the first place,14
and the reasons differ for sovereign states than for other
shareholders. In the usual context, a shareholder’s control over the
corporation derives largely from voting and other rights attendant
to stock ownership.15 Sovereigns may value these rights but can
assert control without them.16 In the usual context, owners rely on
limited liability to shield personal assets from the entity’s creditors,
and to protect the entity from owners’ creditors. But sovereigns do
not need organizational law to the same extent to partition assets.
That is because the law of foreign sovereign immunity
automatically creates a partition between assets the state uses for
commercial activities and assets it devotes to other purposes.17
With limited exceptions, creditors can enforce claims only against
commercial assets. Moreover, the law in the United States further
partitions commercial assets owned by a foreign state into separate
pools associated with different commercial activities.18 This result,
which owes no debt whatsoever to organizational law, loosely
resembles the modern business firm, which siloes risks associated
with distinct commercial activities into multiple, legally separate
entities.19 To be sure, sovereign states do want foreign courts to
respect the corporate form, and their reasons are not entirely
distinct from those that motivate other shareholders.
contracts. If allowed to enforce their claims against government assets, they may be in
a position to disrupt the government’s future access to foreign financial and
commercial markets.
13. See Crystallex Int’l Corp. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venez., 333 F. Supp. 3d 380
(D. Del. 2018) (granting motion by creditor holding arbitration award against Venezuela to
attach PDVSA’s equity stake in CITGO Holding), aff’d, 932 F.3d 126 (3d Cir. 2019), cert. denied,
140 S. Ct. 2762 (2020).
14. David Milton, Piercing the Corporate Veil, Financial Responsibility, and the Limits of
Limited Liability, 56 EMORY L.J. 1305, 1326 (2007); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Abolishing Veil
Piercing, 26 J. CORP. L. 479 (2001).
15. Poonam Puri, The Future of Stakeholder Interests in Corporate Governance,
48 CANADIAN BUS. L.J. 427, 428 (2009); Jill E. Fisch, Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law:
The Role of Shareholder Primacy, 31 J. CORP. L. 637, 652–53 (2006).
16. See infra Section I.B.1.
17. See infra Section I.B.2.
18. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(2).
19. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 3, at 400–01.
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But organizational law does work for sovereigns distinct from work
done for other types of shareholders.20
Part I of this Article provides background on the asset
partitioning benefits of organizational law. These include
protecting owners from creditors of the entity and, perhaps more
important, protecting the entity from its owners’ creditors. Part I
also describes veil piercing doctrine as it has evolved in the
traditional context. In First National City Bank v. Banco Para el
Comercio Exterior de Cuba (Bancec), the U.S. Supreme Court
presumptively recognized the separate legal status of entities
owned by foreign governments.21 When creditors try to overcome
this presumption, courts have incorporated veil piercing doctrine
almost wholesale—albeit with one important modification22—from
the traditional context. That practice might be justified if sovereign
states need organizational law for the same reasons as other
shareholders. And to an extent, Bancec suggests that they do; much
of the Court’s reasoning emphasizes the familiar asset-partitioning
benefits of organizational law. Part I closes, however, by
highlighting an important, but often overlooked, limitation of
Bancec’s reasoning. The case involved the role of organizational law
in protecting state-owned entities from the sovereign’s creditors.
It did not require the Court to consider the extent to which
sovereigns require similar protection or to articulate reasons for
insulating foreign states from the liabilities of state-owned firms.
Part I explains why sovereign states differ from other owners of
firms. Importantly, I focus on disputes arising out of commercial
activities conducted by foreign states or state-owned entities. I do
not focus on other potential sources of liability, such as cases arising
from acts of state-sponsored terrorism or from expropriation in

20. Sovereigns also implicate concerns, such as comity and reciprocity, that are
present but less pronounced in cases involving privately-owned foreign corporations.
This is not to say that veil piercing decisions are—or should be—premised on notions of
comity or reciprocity. It is not clear that such considerations can produce principled results.
The claim is descriptive: courts explicitly (and sometimes implicitly) take these
considerations into account when deciding whether to pierce the veil of an entity owned by
a foreign sovereign. See First National City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba
(Bancec), 462 U.S. 611, 626 (1983).
21. Id. at 627.
22. See infra notes 32–36 and accompanying text.
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violation of international law. These scenarios implicate a different
and less protective set of sovereign immunity rules.23
In the commercial context relevant here, one difference relates
to the mechanisms by which sovereign states wield control over
state-owned entities. States view these entities as policy vehicles,
often for achieving objectives unrelated to profit maximization.24
Political actors may value ownership as a lever of control.25 But
because the owner is sovereign, it has many other levers, such as
the ability to regulate. This complicates the application of veil
piercing doctrine. A state may extensively wield power as an owner
without implicating any policy relevant to organizational law. By
contrast, it may extensively wield power as a sovereign to
accomplish goals that would be forbidden to any other owner.
A second difference relates to the reasons why states need
organizational law. As noted, states benefit from an important kind
of asset partitioning by default. The law of foreign sovereign
immunity, at least in the United States, effectively divides a state’s
assets into distinct pools associated with distinct commercial
activities. Because of this, sovereigns already enjoy significant
owner protections; they do not need limited liability in the same way
as non-sovereign owners.26 To be sure, organizational law still does
some work in this context; it allows the sovereign to further
subdivide assets associated with the same commercial activity
into distinct, legally-separate pools. But the protections
already afforded by sovereign immunity reduce the importance of
this function.
For sovereigns, organizational law functions primarily as a
means of partitioning contracts, not assets. Many of the protections
of sovereign immunity can be waived by contract, and one
23. Indeed, in some scenarios U.S. law automatically disregards the separate legal
status of state-owned entities. See 28 U.S.C. § 1610(g) (permitting attachment and execution
on property owned by a state agency or instrumentality whether or not Bancec factors are
present); see also Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 138 S. Ct. 816 (2018) (holding that
notwithstanding 28 U.S.C. § 1610(g), creditors must demonstrate that the property at issue is
not otherwise immune from attachment and execution under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1609–10).
24. See infra Section I.B.1.
25. Cf. Julian Velasco, Shareholder Ownership and Primacy, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 897
(discussing relationship between shareholders and corporations); ALDO MUSACCHIO &
SERGIO G. LAZZARINI, REINVENTING STATE CAPITALISM: LEVIATHAN IN BUSINESS, BRAZIL AND
BEYOND 7–13 (2014) (discussing ownership models for state-owned entities and varieties of
state capitalism).
26. See infra Section I.B.2.
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consequence of veil piercing is that courts may impute the entity’s
contractual obligations to the owner.27 State-owned entities can
bestow upon creditors contract rights—especially arbitration
clauses and waivers of sovereign immunity—that would be costly
for the sovereign to grant. If imputed to the sovereign itself, these
contract rights will dramatically reduce the protections of
sovereign immunity law. Respecting the boundaries imposed by
organizational law ensures that this happens only in rare cases.
When it comes to entity protections, however, organizational law
plays a crucial role for state-owned firms, just as it does in the usual
context. The reason is that sovereign immunity offers less
protection to state-owned firms than it offers to the state itself.
A legally-separate entity qualifies for immunity (if at all) only as an
“agency or instrumentality” of the state.28 If a foreign state is its
majority owner, the entity will typically be entitled to sovereign
immunity.29 The same is true of many non-U.S. entities over which
the sovereign wields significant control.30 But for other entities,
such as most subsidiaries of state-owned firms, sovereign
immunity does no work whatsoever. Moreover, even when
protected by sovereign immunity, state agencies and
instrumentalities receive less protection than the state itself.31
Organizational law thus serves its traditional asset-protective
function in this context.
Part II explores implications, beginning with questions
implicated by the myriad ways in which sovereign states exercise
control over state-owned entities. As noted, when dealing with
such entities, courts in the United States have imported veil
piercing doctrine almost wholesale from the traditional corporate
context. But there is one important exception. In the traditional
context, courts occasionally assert that veil piercing is appropriate
when the owner “dominates or controls” the entity, without
explicitly requiring that the owner use its control to harm creditors

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
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or subvert important legal policies.32 This is the so-called “alter
ego” justification for veil piercing.33 In practice, however, courts do
not invoke the alter ego theory to pierce the veil of an ordinary
limited liability entity unless the owner’s domination of the entity
produces “some fraud or wrong mandating disregard of the
corporate form.”34 By contrast, when the entity is owned by a
foreign sovereign, control alone can justify veil piercing.35
Moreover, while many of the alter ego cases involving foreign
sovereigns involve some degree of fraud or wrongdoing, there are
cases in which courts pierce the veil without identifying any
concrete harm resulting from the sovereign’s control.36
Part II attempts to articulate a principled justification for (and
limitations on) the rule that a foreign sovereign’s domination of an
entity justifies veil piercing without specific proof of fraud or
injustice.37 Sensibly understood, the alter ego theory rests on the
insight that control can be used to both enable and obscure the
opportunistic subordination of creditors. In particular, some
manifestations of control permit debtors to strategically declare
that an asset in fact belongs to another party. Outside of the
sovereign context, for instance, an owner might keep such poor
records that one cannot tell whether an asset belongs to the
corporation or to the owner.38 When control is manifested in such

32. See, e.g., Carte Blanche (Sing.) Pte., Ltd. v. Diners Club Int’l, Inc., 2 F.3d 24, 26
(2d Cir. 1993); Gartner v. Snyder, 607 F.2d 582, 586 (2d Cir. 1979); Itel Containers Int’l Corp.
v. Atlanttrafik Express Serv. Ltd., 909 F.2d 698, 703 (2d Cir. 1990).
33. TNS Holdings, Inc. v. MKI Sec. Corp., 703 N.E.2d 749, 751 (N.Y. 1998).
34. See, e.g., id.
35. See infra notes 196–207 and accompanying text.
36. For example, in the Crystallex litigation, the district court invoked the alter ego
theory to allow creditors of Venezuela to attach assets belonging to state-owned PDVSA.
Crystallex Int’l Corp. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 333 F. Supp. 3d 380, 395–98
(D. Del. 2018). Despite noting that the alter ego theory “inherently assumes that some
element of unfairness would result if the Court fails to treat one entity as the alter ego of the
other,” the court did not identify any unfairness that would result in that case. Id. at 397 n.15.
37. When a creditor seeks to impute an entity’s conduct to its state owner, the alter
ego theory does not require that the state actually direct the entity’s liability-generating
conduct. In such cases, agency law might provide a basis for imposing liability on the state;
there would be no need for the alter ego theory. See infra notes 198–201.
38. See Macey & Mitts, supra note 6, at 113.
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a way, veil piercing is appropriate to prevent debtors from
unilaterally declaring assets to be beyond the creditors’ reach.39
Similar principles are in play when the entity is owned by a
foreign sovereign. In this context, however, the law of foreign
sovereign immunity, more than organizational law, determines the
rights of creditors. Part II argues that, if courts are to treat control
alone as sufficient to pierce the veil, they should make clear that a
sovereign’s domination of an entity matters only when the
sovereign uses its control to subvert the law of foreign sovereign
immunity. That law—represented in the United States by the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA)—allows foreign
states and state-owned entities to forge commercial ties with the
United States but requires them to place at risk their assets
associated with liability-generating activity.40 Veil piercing under a
pure alter ego theory is appropriate when (and only when) a
state violates this implicit bargain, using control over an entity to
engage in commerce while keeping non-immune assets away
from creditors.
Part II also examines whether the source of a state’s control
rights should affect the veil piercing analysis. Some courts arguably
have suggested that acts taken in the exercise of “sovereign
powers” should be disregarded for purposes of the veil piercing
inquiry. What matters, these courts suggest, is whether the
sovereign abuses its rights as owner. But it makes little sense to draw
such a distinction. It is the purpose for which the state uses its
control that matters. There is no meaningful difference between,
39. Id. By contrast, other forms of control, such as failure to hold regular directors’
meetings, do not create the risk of opportunism; it “makes no sense” to premise veil piercing
on such matters. Id.
40. The point is not that the state must place at risk sufficient assets to cover
anticipated liabilities. Instead, it is that the law of foreign sovereign immunity recognizes
that states often behave as commercial actors and insists that, to the extent this happens, the
state should not gain unfair advantage over private commercial actors. A primary
motivation for the U.S. government’s adoption of the restrictive theory of immunity was
concern that the law of foreign sovereign immunity was giving an advantage to state-owned
firms, especially those in Soviet bloc countries. See Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal
Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Philip B. Perlman, Acting U.S. Attorney General
(May 19, 1952), in 26 DEP’T ST. BULL. 969, 985 (June 23, 1952) (noting that the desire to insulate
state-owned firms acting abroad “obviously motivate[d]” the Soviet Union’s continued
embrace of absolute immunity); H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 6–7 (1976) (noting that “foreign
state enterprises are every day participants in commercial activities” and that extending
immunity to such cases “call[ed] into question whether our citizens will have access to the
courts in order to resolve ordinary legal disputes”).
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say, a dividend payment that leaves a state-owned corporation
insolvent and a confiscatory tax (or mandatory contribution to
social programs) that produces the same result.
Finally, Part II offers tentative thoughts on whether courts
should be more (or less) willing to pierce the veil of an entity owned
by a foreign sovereign. Any case involving such an entity
implicates considerations of comity and reciprocity that are muted,
although not entirely absent, in other settings. For instance, courts
hesitate to pierce the veil of state-owned entities so that foreign
jurisdictions will reciprocate when asked to pierce the veil of a U.S.
corporation acting abroad.41 Despite this, there is an argument that
courts have been too reluctant to impute the liabilities of a
state-owned entity to its sovereign owner, especially in cases where
the entity’s contracts do not impose significant additional risk for
the sovereign. By contrast, courts should be especially reluctant to
allow the sovereign’s creditors to reach assets owned by a
state-owned entity. Here, organizational law serves its usual
entity-shielding function, and considerations of comity and
reciprocity provide additional reason for caution.
I. WHY (AND WHETHER) ORGANIZATIONAL LAW MATTERS
At the outset, let me offer three points of clarification. First,
except when greater precision is needed, I will use the term “veil
piercing” broadly to refer to several, ostensibly separate,
justifications for disregarding the separate legal status of a limited
liability entity. For example, some courts understand the alter ego
theory to permit veil piercing based only on a shareholder’s
“domination or control” of the corporation, whether or not that
control results in any clearly-identified fraud or unfairness to a
creditor.42 Other courts have invoked agency law,43 often without
41. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 29–30 (“If U.S. law did not respect the separate
juridical identities of different agencies or instrumentalities, it might encourage foreign
jurisdictions to disregard the juridical divisions between different U.S. corporations or
between a U.S. corporation and its independent subsidiary.”).
42. See, e.g., Carte Blanche (Sing.) Pte., Ltd. v. Diners Club Int’l, Inc., 2 F.3d 24, 26
(2d Cir. 1993); Pearson v. Component Tech. Corp., 247 F.3d 471, 485 (3d Cir. 2001). See
generally Stephen B. Presser, The Bogalusa Explosion, “Single Business Enterprise,” “Alter Ego,”
and Other Errors: Academics, Economics, Democracy, and Shareholder Limited Liability: Back
Towards a Unitary “Abuse” Theory of Piercing the Corporate Veil, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 405,
412–15 (2006).
43. Pearson, 247 F.3d at 487 n.5.
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making clear whether and how this differs from other analyses.44
These distinctions appear in cases involving both sovereign and
non-sovereign shareholders.
Second, I am mostly concerned with the law of the United
States. Although state law usually governs veil piercing questions,
federal law governs when a foreign sovereign is the owner.45
Although focused on U.S. law, I will occasionally note how the
United States differs from other countries in its application of the
law of foreign sovereign immunity.46 Because of these differences,
a U.S. court’s decision to pierce the corporate veil can have greater
consequences outside of the United States, if recognized by courts
in other countries.47
Finally, I should be clear what I mean when I refer to a stateowned corporation. Governments of all sorts hold ownership
stakes of all kinds in many different limited liability entities.48
I will mostly ignore differences in entity type and will use the
terms “sovereign-owned” and “state-owned” interchangeably and
only when:
•

an entity is organized under a law that entitles it to
separate legal status, and

44. In some cases, it appears that the court invokes agency law as a metaphor, “simply
to justify a conclusion that . . . liability should follow from shareholder control.” Milton, supra
note 14, at 1332. These cases often lack evidence—central to finding that an actual agency
relationship exists—that the controlling shareholder assented to have the subsidiary act on
its behalf. Id. At least a few cases, however, more carefully distinguish agency law from veil
piercing doctrine. See, e.g., Transamerica Leasing, Inc. v. Republic of Venez.,
200 F.3d 843, 849 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
45. Principles of international law may also inform the analysis. See Bancec,
462 U.S. 611, 623 (1983).
46. E.g., infra notes 170, 175–76 and accompanying text.
47. In particular, many countries allow creditors to enforce claims by attaching and
executing upon all commercial assets of a foreign state. See, e.g., State Immunity Act, (1978)
§ 13(4) HALS. STAT. (UK). Under U.S. law, by contrast, a creditor whose claim arises out of a
foreign state’s commercial activity, and who does not benefit from a waiver of sovereign
immunity or arbitration award, generally may attach an asset if the asset is “used for a
commercial activity in the United States” and when the asset “is or was used for the
commercial activity upon which the claim is based.” 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a), (a)(2). It is this latter
requirement—of a nexus between the asset and the claim—that creates a partition between
pools of assets devoted to distinct commercial activities. For further discussion, see infra
Section I.B.2.a.
48. See ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF STATE-OWNED
ENTERPRISES: A SURVEY OF OECD COUNTRIES (2005) (summarizing practices of OECD
member states with regard to state ownership).
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•

a foreign state (as that term is defined under
international law), or a political subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality of such a state, directly or indirectly
holds a controlling ownership interest.49

When an entity meets these criteria, (i) the law of foreign
sovereign immunity protects the owner (although the protection is
not absolute), (ii) the law of foreign sovereign immunity may
protect the entity, and (iii) the state has demonstrated that it values
the control and other rights associated with ownership.50 The
definition excludes entities whose owners cannot claim immunity
as foreign sovereigns. For example, it does not cover lawsuits in U.S.
courts against corporations created by U.S. states or by Native
American tribal governments. Such entities raise similar questions
but merit separate treatment, as the applicable rules of immunity
derive from domestic law.
For an example of an entity that meets this definition, return
again to Venezuela and its relationship to state oil company
PDVSA. Venezuela is a foreign state. In addition to PDVSA, it owns
other legally independent Venezuelan entities, such as heavy
industry conglomerate Corporación Venezolana de Guayana
(CVG). The law of foreign sovereign immunity regards such
entities as agencies or instrumentalities of the state.51 Sovereign
immunity protects them, although to a lesser extent than it protects
the state itself.52 Each state-owned firm conducts operations
through domestic (and at times foreign) subsidiaries. Venezuelan
49. Under international law, a state is an entity with a defined territory and permanent
population, under the control of its own government, that engages or has the capacity to
engage in formal relations with other such entities. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 201 (AM. LAW INST. 1987). A state can hold a
controlling interest without holding the majority of voting shares. See generally ORG. FOR
ECON. COOP. & DEV., OECD GUIDELINES ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF STATE-OWNED
ENTERPRISES (2015 ed. 2015) (defining ownership and control to include holding a majority
of voting shares or “otherwise exercising an equivalent degree of control”). The law of
foreign sovereign immunity protects such entities, as well as their political subdivisions,
agencies, and instrumentalities. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a).
50. Some aspects of the discussion to follow can usefully be applied to other entities.
For example, states routinely hold minority interests in entities, either directly or through
state-controlled entities such as sovereign wealth funds. See, e.g., MUSACCHIO & LAZZARINI,
supra note 25, at 47–50. As sovereigns, these state owners are entitled (at least presumptively)
to sovereign immunity.
51. 28 U.S.C. § 1603.
52. See infra Section I.B.2.b.
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subsidiaries may be able to assert sovereign immunity as a defense
to legal proceedings in the United States. Subsidiaries organized
under U.S. law cannot. 53 Although I reserve detailed discussion for
later, the figure below depicts these relationships (in grossly
simplified form) and the distinctions drawn by sovereign
immunity law.
Venezuela

Protected (though
less so) by sovereign
immunity

Protected by
sovereign immunity

PDVSA

CVG

No sovereign
immunity

U.S. holding and
operating
subsidiaries

Protected (though
less so) by sovereign
immunity

Venezuelan
subsidiaries

May be protected
by sovereign
immunity

A. Organizational Law When the Owner Is (and Is Not) a Sovereign
Limited liability entities shield owners’ assets from claims
asserted by the entity’s creditors.54 The entity, in turn, is protected
from claims asserted by creditors of its owners.55 The decision to
pierce the corporate veil withdraws these protections. To
understand when it makes sense to do this, one must first
understand why asset partitioning matters in the first place.56 Only
then can we decide whether doctrine developed in the traditional
corporate context can sensibly be applied to state-owned entities.

53. An agency or instrumentality must be “neither a citizen of a State of the United
States . . . nor created under the laws of any third country.” 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b)(3).
54. Henry Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman & Richard Squire, Law and the Rise of the Firm,
119 HARV. L. REV. 1335, 1336 (2006).
55. Id.
56. Bainbridge, supra note 14, at 487 (“The extent to which one believes courts should
invoke the veil piercing remedy . . . depends in the first instance on one’s assessment of the
policy merits of limited liability itself.”); Peter B. Oh, Veil-Piercing Unbound, 93 B.U. L. REV.
89, 91 (2013) (“[V]eil piercing is justified potentially only when limited liability is not.”).
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1. Owner and entity shielding in the traditional setting
I keep the discussion in this Section brief, in recognition of the
fact that much ink has already been spilled on the functions of
organizational law in general and on veil piercing in particular.57 I
begin with the owner-shielding aspects of organizational law, best
exemplified by the rule that shareholders are not personally liable
for corporate debts unless their own conduct provides a basis for
liability.58 The usual justification for the rule runs something like
this: limited liability reduces monitoring costs and the cost of firm
governance,59 enables investor diversification,60 increases
liquidity,61 and (hopefully) encourages an appropriate level of risktaking by firms engaged in economic activity.62
For present purposes, it is unnecessary to elaborate on these
claims, but a brief example may illustrate.63 Consider the
57. For just a few examples, see Macey & Mitts, supra note 6, at 99; Hansmann &
Kraakman, supra note 3, at 401; Hansmann et al., supra note 54, at 1352; Bainbridge, supra
note 14; Alexander, supra note 4, at 391; Oh, supra note 56, at 91; Robert B. Thompson, Piercing
the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1036, 1058 (1991); Christina L. Boyd
& David A. Hoffman, Disputing Limited Liability, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 853, 854 (2010); and Blair,
supra note 5, at 391.
58. See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.22 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011).
59. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 3, at 424–25; Bainbridge, supra note 14, at 490.
60. Bainbridge, supra note 14, at 490.
61. See generally FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991).
62. See, e.g., Stephen B. Presser, Commentary, Thwarting the Killing of the Corporation:
Limited Liability, Democracy, and Economics, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 148, 164 (1992) (linking limited
liability to the desire to promote entrepreneurial activity). We might add a variety of
procedural and other concerns that underpin the limited liability rule. See, e.g., Alexander,
supra note 4 (exploring procedural barriers to the expansion of shareholder liability); Poonam
Puri, Judgment Proofing the Profession, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 21 (2001) (describing
evolution of veil piercing as an exception to the rule of limited liability for shareholders).
63. Much (though by no means all) corporate law theory embraces the so-called
nexus-of-contracts model, which views firms as webs of implicit contracts between groups
of claimants with competing interests in the firm’s earnings. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note
14; EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 61, at 1–39; Larry E. Ribstein, Limited Liability and
Theories of the Corporation, 50 MD. L. REV. 80 (1991); William W. Bratton, Jr., The “Nexus of
Contracts” Corporation: A Critical Appraisal, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 407 (1989). For present
purposes, one need not embrace the nexus-of-contracts model of the corporation, which
despite its prominence has attracted criticism. See, e.g., Bratton, supra, at 410 (arguing that the
nexus-of-contracts model “suffers from a single-mindedness of its own, and, as a result, fails
to offer a viable contractual theory of the corporation”). It is only necessary to realize that the
owner- and entity-shielding consequences of incorporation are less relevant to sovereign
states, and to accept that veil piercing doctrine should be informed by the purposes of
organizational law in this setting.
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relationship between shareholders and voluntary creditors of a
publicly held corporation. The shareholders lack the inclination,
expertise, and ability to monitor corporate managers or the
solvency of other shareholders (who, absent limited liability, will
be jointly liable for corporate debts). For them, unlimited liability
creates risks that cannot be effectively mitigated; they will therefore
favor the limited liability rule.64 For creditors, it is a closer call, but
it is not obvious that they would prefer a rule of unlimited liability
given the cost of pursuing claims against dispersed investors.65
At least arguably, then, these parties would contract for the limited
liability rule, if it were necessary and feasible to contract.
Similar justifications support the entity-shielding aspects of
organizational law. For instance, because creditors of a corporation
have priority claims to firm assets, they need not concern
themselves with monitoring the solvency of shareholders.66 By
contrast, if a shareholder’s creditors could force a liquidation of
corporate assets, a prospective transaction partner would struggle
to assess the risk of dealing with the corporation: “Intimate
familiarity with the firm’s own assets and business affairs would
not suffice to determine the firm’s creditworthiness; knowledge of
the personal creditworthiness of each of the firm’s owners would
be necessary as well.”67 Arguably, this entity-shielding function of
organizational law is most important, for it would be difficult or
impossible to replicate by contract.68
Veil piercing is a de-partitioning remedy.69 One would think,
therefore, that courts would pierce the corporate veil only after
deciding that it is no longer appropriate to respect the boundaries
between the entity and its owners (or between the entity and its
various subsidiaries).70 At first glance, however, the law of veil
piercing is in some disarray. In general, courts pierce the corporate
veil when the owner exercises complete domination over the
corporation and uses that control to perpetrate a fraud or injustice
64. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 3, at 424; Bainbridge, supra note 14, at 492.
65. Bainbridge, supra note 14, at 492–94.
66. Id. at 492–93.
67. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 3, at 402–03.
68. Id. at 432; Hansmann, Kraakman & Squire, supra note 54, at 1340–41.
69. Hansmann & Squire, supra note 10, at 1.
70. Oh, supra note 56, at 91 (“[V]eil-piercing is justified potentially only when limited
liability is not.”).
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(as when a shareholder leaves other creditors in the lurch by
siphoning away corporate assets).71 On occasion, the two parts of
this test are phrased disjunctively, so that a creditor may pierce the
veil upon showing either that the owner extensively dominated the
corporation or that the owner used the corporate form to perpetrate
fraud.72 The former theory—extensive domination and control—
is sometimes called “alter ego” liability.73 As implemented,
however, courts generally invoke the alter ego theory to pierce the
veil only when the owner’s domination “leads to a wrong against
third parties.”74
In practice, courts often analyze veil piercing questions
by invoking a laundry list of factors. These include (among
many others)75:
•

undercapitalization

•

commingling of corporate and personal assets

•

failure to observe corporate formalities

•

failure to pay dividends

•

siphoning of corporate funds

•

failure to keep corporate records

•

the corporation’s payment of the shareholder’s
personal obligations, and

•

the shareholder’s use of the corporate form to pursue
personal objectives

Many of these factors have no obvious connection to the reasons
why the law might (or might not) respect the corporate form.76 It is
not obvious, for example, why it advances the underlying purposes
of the law to impose personal liability on a shareholder who has

71. PRESSER, supra note 5.
72. See, e.g., Carte Blanche (Sing.) Pte., Ltd. v. Diners Club Int’l, Inc., 2 F.3d 24
(2d Cir. 1993); Gartner v. Snyder, 607 F.2d 582, 586 (2d Cir. 1979); Itel Containers Int’l Corp.
v. Atlanttrafik Express Serv. Ltd., 909 F.2d 698, 703 (2d Cir. 1990).
73. Itel Containers, 909 F.2d at 703.
74. Wm. Passalacqua Builders, Inc. v. Resnick Devs. S., Inc., 933 F.2d 131, 138
(2d Cir. 1991).
75. Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Veil Within Corporate Groups: Corporate
Shareholders as Mere Investors, 13 CONN. J. INT’L L. 379 (1999).
76. Oh, supra note 56, at 90.
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failed to observe corporate formalities.77 Thus, it is perhaps no
surprise that the law of veil piercing has been criticized as
incoherent.78 But this does not necessarily mean there is no order in
the cases. Jonathan Macey and Joshua Mitts, for instance, assert that
courts pierce the veil in three categories of cases: to further
statutory or regulatory goals (such as those relating to
environmental law), to prevent shareholders from obtaining credit
by misrepresentation, and to promote bankruptcy-type values (as
by preventing shareholders from transferring corporate assets to
themselves, thus elevating themselves over higher priority
creditors).79 For present purposes, readers need not accept that veil
piercing cases can be rationally sorted according to this typology.80
The important point is that efforts to make sense of veil piercing
doctrine reflect the (sensible) view that courts should pierce the veil
only “to achieve discrete, specific policy objectives.”81

77. See Bainbridge, supra note 14, at 511–12; Milton, supra note 14, at 1335–36; Macey
& Mitts, supra note 6, at 109 (“[P]iercing the corporate veil for failing to observe corporate
formalities . . . makes no sense. It is like imposing liability on a person because he did not
wear a tie or keep a napkin in his lap while eating.”).
78. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation,
52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89, 89 (1985) (referring to the law of veil piercing as “severe, and
unprincipled”); Frederick Tung, Limited Liability and Creditors’ Rights: The Limits of Risk
Shifting to Creditors, 34 GA. L. REV. 547, 568 (2000) (criticizing veil piercing doctrine as vague);
Steven L. Schwarcz, Collapsing Corporate Structures: Resolving the Tension Between Form and
Substance, 60 BUS. LAW. 109, 113 (2004) (calling veil piercing doctrine “conceptually
confusing”); Oh, supra note 56, at 90 (referring to the law of veil piercing as an
“abysmal failure”).
79. See Macey & Mitts, supra note 6.
80. For example, Macy and Mitts rely on automated text analysis of judicial opinions,
which accompany only a small minority of judicial actions. See, e.g., David A. Hoffman, Alan
J. Izenman & Jeffrey R. Lidicker, Docketology, District Courts, and Doctrine, 85 WASH. U. L. REV.
681, 710 (2007); Margo Schlanger & Denise Lieberman, Using Court Records for Research,
Teaching, and Policymaking: The Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse, 75 UMKC L. REV. 155, 165
(2006). Moreover, judicial opinions do not necessarily reveal the actual reasons for a decision;
they do not “tell us what went on in judges’ minds,” but do reveal “what judges think is
legitimate argument and legitimate authority, justifying their behavior.” Lawrence M.
Friedman, Robert A. Kagan, Bliss Cartwright & Stanton Wheeler, State Supreme Courts:
A Century of Style and Citation, 33 STAN. L. REV. 773, 794 (1981). Thus, Christina Boyd and
David Hoffman criticize much veil piercing scholarship for placing too much reliance on
“how judges justify themselves,” leading critics to paint a caricature of veil piercing doctrine
that “predict[s] the iceberg by its odd, biased tip.” Christina L. Boyd & David A. Hoffman,
Disputing Limited Liability, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 853, 855 (2010). Boyd and Hoffman’s work
identifies other, often non legal, factors associated with the decision to pierce the
corporate veil.
81. Macey & Mitts, supra note 6, at 100–01.
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Put differently, one should disregard an entity’s separate legal
status only when the reasons for respecting it are absent. Of course,
this requires an understanding of why separate legal status matters
in the first place. For state-owned entities, it is not clear that such
an understanding exists.
2. Bancec’s incomplete case for entity shielding in the sovereign context
In the seminal Bancec case, the Supreme Court held that when
“government instrumentalities [are] established as juridical entities
distinct and independent from their sovereign [they] should
normally be treated as such.”82 Invoking principles “common to
international law and federal common law,”83 Bancec made clear
that U.S. courts must respect the separate legal status of entities
owned by foreign sovereigns except when the “entity is so
extensively controlled by its owner that a relationship of principal
and agent is created” or when respecting the entity’s separate legal
status “would work fraud or injustice.”84 Though derived from a
different source—organizational law is typically state law—this
formulation does not distinguish state-owned from other entities.
The Bancec majority did not try to articulate clear rules for
determining when to disregard the separate legal status of
state-owned entities. It did, however, offer a preliminary
justification for its willingness to indulge the fiction of separate
legal personhood in this context. To understand the limits of its
reasoning, it will help to keep in mind that Bancec was a “reverse”
veil piercing case, which implicated the entity shielding functions
of organizational law. The question was whether a U.S. bank with
an expropriation claim against the Cuban government could assert
this claim as a set-off in an action brought by a legally separate,
state-owned entity.85 Bancec did not involve an attempt to reach
government assets by a creditor of a state-owned entity.86
In explaining its decision, the Bancec majority invoked
principles that would be familiar to any student of corporate law.

82. Bancec, 462 U.S. 611, 626–27 (1983).
83. Id. at 613.
84. Id. at 629. See also Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 138 S. Ct. 816, 822 (2018).
85. Bancec, 462 U.S. at 613–14.
86. Such an attempt would match the traditional veil piercing scenario and implicate
the owner-shielding functions of limited liability.
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For instance, the majority emphasized that entity shielding
facilitates access to credit for state-owned corporations:
Freely ignoring the separate status of government
instrumentalities would result in substantial uncertainty over
whether an instrumentality’s assets would be diverted to satisfy a
claim against the sovereign, and might thereby cause third parties
to hesitate before extending credit to a government
instrumentality without the government’s guarantee.87

This reasoning would not be out of place in a modern
discussion of the benefits of limited liability in a corporation with
non-sovereign shareholders. In both sovereign and non-sovereign
settings, entity shielding lets prospective creditors transact with the
entity without monitoring the solvency of its owners.88 Bancec’s
reasoning likewise provides a reason to respect the separate legal
status of affiliated entities within one state-controlled firm.89 Here,
too, the Court’s opinion would not be out of place in a modern
discussion of the benefits of complex corporate structures involving
non-sovereign shareholders.90 It bears repeating, however, that
Bancec was discussing the benefits of entity shielding—i.e.,
insulating firm assets from claims by creditors of the shareholder.
The majority’s reasoning provides no explicit justification for owner
shielding—i.e., insulating owners from claims by creditors of the
firm. I return to this important distinction shortly.91

87. Bancec, 462 U.S. at 626.
88. See De Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 748 F.2d 790, 795 n.1 (2d Cir. 1984) (noting that
imposing a government shareholder’s liabilities on a state-owned corporation would create
risks for lenders and other “unsuspecting third parties”); Bank of N.Y. v. Yugoimport,
745 F.3d 599, 614 n.14 (2d. Cir. 2014) (“In the case of a developing country, diversion of an
instrumentality’s assets to satisfy debts of the sovereign could stymie investment and cause
third-parties dealing with the instrumentality to demand government guarantees.”);
Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 3, at 402 (noting that, but for the entity shielding function
of organizational law, “creditors of any single owner would have the right to proceed against
that owner’s share of the firm’s assets in case of the individual’s insolvency”).
89. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 29 (1976) (“Section 1610(b) will not permit execution
against the property of one agency or instrumentality to satisfy a judgment against another,
unrelated agency or instrumentality.”).
90. See, e.g., Anthony J. Casey, The New Corporate Web: Tailored Entity Partitions and
Creditors’ Selective Enforcement, 124 YALE L. J. 2680 (2015) (characterizing complex corporate
groups as designed to allow efficient creditor monitoring, including the ability to select
between project-specific and firm-wide enforcement).
91. See infra Section I.B.2.b.
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To be sure, the Bancec majority opinion also highlights
considerations unique to, or more acutely raised by, state-owned
entities. “[P]rinciples of comity,” the majority noted, also justify the
presumption of independence afforded to state-owned entities.92
Quoting the authoritative House Report on the FSIA, the Court
posited that a U.S. court’s refusal to respect the separate legal status
of a state-owned entity “might encourage foreign jurisdictions to
disregard the juridical divisions between different U.S.
corporations or between a U.S. corporation and its independent
subsidiary.”93 To a degree, this concern is implicated whenever a
U.S. court is faced with any entity organized under the law of a
foreign state, but it is especially acute when the foreign state is
the owner.
The concern for comity also suggests a justification for
extending the owner-shielding aspects of limited liability to foreign
sovereigns. Perhaps U.S. courts should protect the sovereign’s
assets from creditors of a state-owned entity to avoid creating
diplomatic headaches and to encourage foreign jurisdictions to
reciprocate by protecting owners of U.S. entities, whether or not
owned by the federal government. That is a primary concern
animating the law of foreign sovereign immunity;94 it might also
justify extending owner shielding to foreign sovereigns. Indeed,
after Bancec, courts faced with traditional veil piercing questions
have invoked comity to justify the presumption that state-owned
entities are separate from their owners.95 In the main, however,

92. Bancec, 462 U.S. at 626. The majority referenced the authoritative House Report
accompanying the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, which expressed the concern
that “[i]f U.S. law did not respect the separate juridical identities of different agencies or
instrumentalities, it might encourage foreign jurisdictions to disregard the juridical divisions
between different U.S. corporations or between a U.S. corporation and its independent
subsidiary.” H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 29–30 (1976).
93. Bancec, 462 U.S. at 627–28 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 29–30 (1976), as
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1976, 6628–29).
94. Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 688 (2004).
95. DRC, Inc. v. Republic of Hond., 71 F. Supp. 3d 201, 209 (D.D.C. 2014) (noting, in
an action to enforce against the government an arbitration award against a state
instrumentality, that the presumption of separateness is “rooted in principles of comity”);
Doe v. Holy See, 557 F.3d 1066, 1079 (9th Cir. 2009) (deciding whether to impute conduct by
a U.S. Archdiocese to the Holy See and noting Bancec’s concern for comity).
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courts have not offered clear justifications for owner shielding in
the context of state-owned entities.96
3. Importing organizational law (mostly) wholesale into the
sovereign context
Bancec left to lower courts the work of fashioning rules for
disregarding the separate legal status of state-owned entities. As
noted, Bancec also implicated the entity-shielding, not the ownershielding, attributes of organizational law. Yet lower courts have
not distinguished between these scenarios.97 In both contexts,
moreover, courts have largely imported the law developed in the
context of “ordinary” limited liability entities. Thus, in deciding
whether a corporation is the “alter ego” or agent of a foreign state,
courts have invoked a familiar laundry list of factors, including
whether the state:
(1) uses the instrumentality’s property as its own; (2) ignores the
instrumentality’s separate status or ordinary corporate
formalities; (3) deprives the instrumentality of the independence
from close political control that is generally enjoyed by
government agencies; (4) requires the instrumentality to obtain
approvals for ordinary business decisions from a political actor;
and (5) issues policies or directives that cause the instrumentality
to act directly on behalf of the sovereign state. 98

96. Again, I do not suggest that considerations of comity and reciprocity can provide
a principled basis for veil piercing decisions. See supra note 20. At most, they represent
a thumb on the scale. As a descriptive matter, it is fair to say that such concerns
partially explain the general reluctance of U.S. courts to pierce the veil of entities owned by
foreign states.
97. See, e.g., Transamerica Leasing, Inc. v. Republic of Venez., 200 F.3d 843, 847–48
(D.C. Cir. 2000). On rare occasions, courts suggest that different policies might be at stake in
the two contexts, but they have not elaborated on the differences. Bayer & Willis, Inc. v.
Republic of Gambia, 283 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5–6 (D.D.C. 2003).
98. Kirschenbaum v. 650 Fifth Ave. & Related Props., 830 F.3d 107, 130 (2d. Cir. 2016);
EM Ltd. v. Banco Central de la República Argentina, 800 F.3d 78, 91 (2d. Cir. 2015).
Conceptually, there is a difference between calling an entity the “alter ego” of its owner—in
the sense that the owner so completely dominates the entity that “they act as one”—and
treating the entity as its owner’s agent. See Transamerica, 200 F.3d at 848. The latter
relationship generally turns on principles of agency law, which overlap only barely with the
“control” factors listed above. See id. at 849. The cases, however, often collapse the inquiry
into one, omnibus inquiry into the extent of the state’s control over the entity.
See, e.g., id. at 848.
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As in the context of non-sovereign owners, courts rarely pause
to explain why the decision whether to respect an entity’s separate
legal status should turn on any of these factors. To the contrary,
outcomes appear to turn on relatively minor distinctions, which
supposedly illuminate the extent to which the state controlled the
entity’s day-to-day operations.99
As an example, in Transamerica, the DC Circuit declined to
pierce the corporate veil between Venezuela and a state-owned
shipping company. It distinguished a prior case, ForemostMcKesson, primarily by noting that, in the earlier case, the
government had “directly controlled [r]outine business decisions,
such as declaring and paying dividends . . . and honoring the
[corporation’s] contractual commitments.”100 In Transamerica, by
contrast, there was little evidence that the state did more than use
its influence over the board of directors to install its preferred
managerial team to address the firm’s operational difficulties.101 In
another case, Kalamazoo Spice, a district judge disregarded the
separate legal status of a state-owned corporation, explaining the
result by noting, among other indicia of control, that a government
ministry had been required to approve all invoices over $13,000 and
that all checks above $25,000 had to be signed by a member of the
board of directors appointed by the government.102
Recall that Bancec allows courts to disregard the separate legal
status of a state-owned entity when the entity and its owner are
“alter egos” or when a contrary decision “would work fraud

99. See, e.g., Walter Fuller Aircraft Sales, Inc. v. Republic of Phil., 965 F.2d 1375,
1382–83 (5th Cir. 1992) (emphasizing importance of day-to-day control); Kirschenbaum, 830
F.3d at 130 (dismissing state’s extensive control over corporation as not enough to show
“day-to-day” control); First Inv. Corp. of Marshall Islands v. Fujian Mawei Shipbuilding,
Ltd., 703 F.3d 742, 753 (5th Cir. 2012) (looking to “the ownership and management structure
of the instrumentality, paying particularly close attention to whether the government is
involved in day-to-day operations, as well as the extent to which the agent holds itself out to
be acting on behalf of the government”) (quoting Walter Fuller, 965 F.2d at 1381); Holy See,
557 F.3d at 1080 (interpreting Bancec to require an inquiry into “day-to-day control’’).
100. Transamerica, 200 F.3d at 853 (internal quotation marks omitted) (also emphasizing
that the corporation had “acted to effectuate a governmental policy” intended to injure the
corporation’s foreign shareholders).
101. See id. at 851; see also id. at 853 (noting that other than “the government’s ownership
of stock and control of the Board of Directors, this case bears no resemblance to McKesson”).
102. Kalamazoo Spice Extraction Co. v. Provisional Military Gov’t of Socialist Ethiopia,
616 F. Supp. 660, 666 (W.D. Mich. 1985).
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or injustice.”103 When evaluating the risk of “fraud or injustice,”
courts have again invoked familiar considerations, asking, for
example, whether the sovereign has siphoned assets or otherwise
manipulated the corporate form to thwart creditors of the
corporation.104 And on occasion, they insist that the injustice result
from misuse of the corporate form, rather than from the exercise of
regulatory or other powers, apparently regardless of the
sovereign’s motivation.105
In Bridas v. Government of Turkmenistan, for instance, the Fifth
Circuit affirmed an arbitration award obtained by an Argentinian
company (Bridas) against the Government of Turkmenistan.106
Bridas had entered into a joint venture with an entity owned by
Turkmenistan to exploit oil and gas reserves located in that
country.107 Thereafter, the government ordered Bridas to suspend
operations and imposed an import/export ban that prevented
further work.108 Although the government’s motive was to increase
“its share of future proceeds” and to “force Bridas’s submission,”
the Fifth Circuit treated the export ban as irrelevant:
The Government’s exercise of its sovereign powers may have
constituted a wrong to Bridas, but it was not a wrong based on
misuse of the corporate organizational form . . . [T]he . . . export
ban is not a “fraud or injustice” for alter ego purposes.109

Instead, the court based its decision on the fact that the
government had dissolved the state-owned counterparty to the
joint venture, replacing it with a thinly capitalized entity funded by

103. First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611,
629 (1983).
104. Bridas S.A.P.I.C. v. Gov’t of Turkm., 447 F.3d 411, 416–20 (5th Cir. 2006).
105. Id. at 417.
106. Id. at 420.
107. Id. at 414.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 415, 417. Note that the Bridas opinion arguably implies that the Bancec test is
conjunctive, requiring both extensive domination and “fraud or injustice.” However,
appealing this understanding, it is hard to square with the Bancec opinion and with later
Supreme Court cases, which treat the “fraud or injustice” test as an independent basis for
disregarding the corporate form. Either way, courts in both the sovereign and non-sovereign
contexts generally do not impose alter ego liability unless some identifiable harm results
from the owner’s domination of the entity. See supra text accompanying note 74; Crystallex
Int’l Corp. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venez., 932 F.3d 126, 141–43 (3d Cir. 2019) (rejecting the
need to find a nexus between the foreign state’s control of the entity and the creditor’s injury).
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assets that were placed out of reach of the entity’s creditors.110
Only such “misuse” of the corporate form, and not the exercise
of “sovereign powers,” could constitute a fraud or injustice
under Bancec.111
I do not necessarily object to the result in any of these cases.112
In Kalamazoo Spice, for example, an investor who had been majority
owner of an Ethiopian corporation sued the government, which
had expropriated the plaintiff’s interest. Believing the government
could not be sued unless it had minimum contacts with the United
States, the court considered whether the expropriated corporation’s
contacts with the United States could be imputed to the
government under an alter ego or agency theory.113 It is easy to see
the argument for doing so, and equally easy to square the result
with the objectives underlying the law of sovereign immunity
(discussed below).114 Put simply: the government induced private
investors to take an equity stake, the value of which derived largely
from the corporation’s ability to conduct commercial activities
abroad. Having expropriated that stake, the government’s
argument implied that the corporation could continue to do
business in the United States without exposing its assets to
collection efforts by the plaintiff. So understood, preserving the
fiction of separate corporate personhood would “insulate [the
110. Bridas, 447 F.3d at 417.
111. Id.
112. Appropriately, courts often focus on whether the foreign state has used the entity
to defraud creditors or obtain credit by false pretenses. See, e.g., Transamerica Leasing, Inc.
v. Republic of Venez., 200 F.3d 843, 854 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (finding no fraud or injustice where
the government “did not manipulate [the corporation] in order to obtain a financial benefit
from the plaintiffs before [the corporation] went bankrupt”); EM Ltd. v. Banco Central de la
República Argentina, 800 F.3d 78, 96 (2d Cir. 2015) (noting that the plaintiffs had not shown
that the country used the central bank “to frustrate the collection efforts of its creditors,” as
by transferring government assets to the central bank in an effort to shelter them from
creditor enforcement efforts).
113. Kalamazoo Spice Extraction Co. v. Provisional Military Gov’t of Socialist Ethiopia,
616 F. Supp. 660, 666 (W.D. Mich. 1985). Although the Supreme Court has not definitively
ruled on the question, most courts hold that foreign states are not persons for due process
purposes and are not entitled to litigation-related constitutional protections. See, e.g.,
Frontera Res. Azerbaijan Corp. v. State Oil Co. of Azerbaijan Republic, 582 F.3d 393, 399–400
(2d Cir. 2009); Price v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d 82, 95–100 (D.C.
Cir. 2002). Among the consequences of this treatment is that the state cannot object to the
jurisdiction of the U.S. courts on the basis of a lack of minimum contacts. See, e.g., Price, 294
F.3d at 95–100. For a critique of this position, see Ingrid Wuerth, The Due Process and Other
Constitutional Rights of Foreign Nations, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 633 (2019).
114. See infra Section I.B.
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government] from liability for expropriation . . . while permitting
[it] . . . to profit from its commercial activities in the US . . . .”115
But while the result is sensible, the problem is that the
explanation focuses largely on trivial concerns with no obvious
relevance to any policy objective. Indeed, subsequent cases reduce
Kalamazoo Spice to its quotidian details, distinguishing it not
because it involved what amounted to fraud, but because of the
extensive day-to-day control supposedly exercised by the
government: in Kalamazoo Spice, you see, the government approved
the checks.116
At one level, my criticism echoes those leveled against veil
piercing doctrine in the usual (non-sovereign) context. There,
observers often describe veil piercing doctrine as incoherent,117
emphasizing that many veil piercing factors, especially those
related to control, have “no logical link or nexus” to any policy
reason for piercing the veil.118 In the sovereign context, however,
the concern runs somewhat deeper. Recall that, in the traditional
context, the alter ego theory lets a court pierce the veil upon finding
that the owner dominated the entity, without any specific reason to
think the owner’s conduct harmed any third party or subverted any
important legal policy.119 But in practice, courts tend to pierce the
veil only when the owner’s domination plausibly results in some
harm or wrongdoing.120 In the sovereign context, the alter ego
decisions do not always link the state’s control to any policy
justification for veil piercing. To be sure, in some cases, such as
Kalamazoo Spice, the facts reveal such a justification, even if it does
not feature prominently in the court’s opinion.121 In others, the
foreign state is treated as the entity’s alter ego based solely on a

115. Kalamazoo Spice, 616 F. Supp. at 666.
116. See, e.g., General Star National Ins. Co. v. Administratia Asigurarilor de Stat, 713
F. Supp. 2d 267, 278 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (distinguishing Kalamazoo Spice, not as a case involving
fraud, but as a case where “all checks above a certain amount were signed by [a] government
official and all orders above a certain amount were subject to government approval”).
117. See supra note 78.
118. Macey & Mitts, supra note 6, at 109.
119. See supra notes 32–33 and accompanying text.
120. Supra note 34.
121. See supra notes 113–15 and accompanying text.
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finding of extensive control over the entity’s operations.122
Especially in these cases, where control produces no obvious harm
to creditors, there is a risk that veil piercing doctrine will become
unmoored from any relevant policy objective.
B. Why Ownership? And What Does Organizational Law Do
for Sovereigns?
The discussion to follow examines why organizational law
matters for sovereign states and state-owned entities. That
discussion requires answers to two fundamental questions. First,
why do sovereign states own controlling interests in corporations
and similar entities? Second, what work does organizational law do
for these entities and their sovereign owners? Put differently, what
happens when we disregard the separate legal personhood of an
entity owned by a sovereign state?
1. The tenuous link between ownership and control
More than ten percent of the world’s largest firms are state
owned.123 These firms control more than 330,000 domestic and
foreign subsidiaries across a wide range of economic sectors, from
natural resource extraction, to arms manufacturing, to
telecommunications, to financial intermediation.124 The sheer
number and diversity of such firms implies that there is no simple
explanation for the fact of state ownership, and I do not offer one
here.125 For present purposes, an incomplete answer will suffice:

122. See supra note 36; see also Crystallex Int’l Corp. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venez.,
333 F. Supp. 3d 380, 399 (D. Del. 2019) (basing alter ego ruling solely on the foreign state’s
extensive control over the entity).
123. Przemyslaw Kowalski, Max Büge, Monika Sztajerowska & Matias Egeland,
State-Owned Enterprises: Trade Effects and Policy Implications 9 (OECD Trade Pol’y Papers,
Policy Paper No. 147, 2013), https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/trade/state-ownedenterprises_5k4869ckqk7l-en; Poonam Puri, Sovereign Veil Piercing at 9 (Feb. 9, 2016 draft on
file with author).
124. Kowalski et al., supra note 123, at 6.
125. There are many explanations for the prevalence of state ownership and many
different models of state capitalism. For background, see MUSACCHIO & LAZZARAINI,
supra note 25, at 57–78. For example, a government may deem ownership necessary to correct
for market failures when private markets do not supply goods and services at optimal levels.
Kowalski et al., supra note 123; ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., supra note 48, at 20. This is a
classic justification offered for government provision of water and sewage services, for
example. See MUSACCHIO & LAZZARAINI, supra note 25, at 23–24.
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Compared to private investors, governments more often view firms
as vehicles for achieving political, economic, and social objectives
unrelated to profit maximization.126 And governments tend to own
firms, at least in part, because they value the tools of corporate
control in achieving these objectives.127 However, states have many
other levers of control, including the ability to tax and impose
regulatory obligations. This complicates any attempt to predicate
veil piercing on a finding of owner “domination.”128 Governments
may be deeply involved as owners without implicating any policy
relevant to organizational law. By contrast, governments may use
“sovereign powers” to accomplish goals that undermine
organizational law’s traditional objectives.129
Begin with the first point: that governments view ownership,
and ownership rights, as tools for pursuing policy objectives. This
is of course a generalization. Patterns of state ownership have
evolved dramatically.130 In recent decades, many state-owned
entities have embraced improved—or at least more corporatized—
governance, with less hands-on management by political actors.131
Political, economic, and ideological considerations also impact
models of state ownership.132 From a governance perspective, there
126. MARY SHIRLEY & JOHN NELLIS, PUBLIC ENTERPRISE REFORM: THE LESSONS OF
EXPERIENCE 16–18 (1991); State-Owned Enterprises: Catalysts for Public Value Creation?, PWC 20
(Apr. 2015), https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/psrc/publications/assets/pwc-state-ownedenterprise-psrc.pdf.
127. Of course, governments may have an ideological preference for state ownership,
see, e.g., MUSACCHIO & LAZZARAINI, supra note 25, at 30, or may see ownership as necessary
to ensure the optimal provision of public goods. But this is just to restate the broader point,
which is that the state views the firm as a tool for achieving policy objectives, and ownership
rights as a desirable lever of control over firm behavior.
128. See Bancec, 462 U.S. 611, 629 (1982).
129. To a degree, these observations also apply to entities with non-sovereign owners.
There is no necessary link between the extent of a shareholder’s control, or the observance of
corporate formalities, and the policies of organizational law. See Macey & Mitts, supra note
6, at 109–10. Moreover, in closely held corporations (where veil piercing is most likely),
shareholders also may exploit social standing, family status, or other sources of authority to
direct corporate behavior. Sovereigns, however, have more, and more powerful, levers of
control. Their use of these levers also raises unique concerns that implicate relations between
sovereign states.
130. See MUSACCHIO & LAZZARAINI, supra note 25, at 23–56.
131. Id. at 281–82; see also ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE
GOVERNANCE REFORM: AN INVENTORY OF RECENT CHANGE 10–30 (2011) (summarizing
developments in governance practices with regard to state owned firms).
132. ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., supra note 131 (summarizing developments in
governance practices with regard to state owned firms).
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are stark differences between, say, a firm whose managers answer
directly to political actors, a firm in which multiple governance tiers
or layers of state bureaucracy buffer managers from political
pressure,133 and a firm in which private investors hold a minority
stake.134 And of course there are some state-owned entities, such as
sovereign wealth funds, where profit maximization will be a more
pronounced concern.
Despite this variance, sovereigns differ from other owners in
that they have more, and different, reasons to intervene in the
entity’s affairs.135 To be sure, state-owned entities may enjoy more
independence than government agencies.136 But states nevertheless
exert substantial control, often far in excess of that we might expect
even from a controlling shareholder in a close corporation. Even
when they act like commercial enterprises in other respects, stateowned firms may be asked to pursue objectives that are “noneconomic, inconsistent, and frequently changing.”137 For example,
some state-owned firms prioritize creating employment
opportunities in poor regions.138 Less benignly, governments might
also view state-owned enterprises as vehicles for dispensing jobs or

133. Ian Thynne, Ownership as an Instrument of Policy and Understanding in the Public
Sphere: Trends and Research Agenda, 32 POL’Y STUD. 183, 188 (2011).
134. See, e.g., Marta Nogueira, Petrobas Respects Minority Shareholders Again:
Board Member, REUTERS (July 24, 2017, 10:00 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/uspetrobras-shareholders/petrobras-respects-minority-shareholders-again-board-memberidUSKBN1A921H. For firms in which some portion of ownership stake is privately held, also
consider the impact of the decision to list shares on a stock exchange whose rules impose
disclosure requirements and constrain corporate governance. See Hans Christiansen & Alissa
Koldertsova, The Role of Stock Exchanges in Corporate Governance (OECD, Working Paper No.
2009/1, 2014), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2384059.
135. See remarks by Jane Chalmers, Attribution Issues in State Responsibility, 84 AM.
SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 51, 63 (1990) (noting that state investment decisions have motivations
beyond “entrepreneurial risk analysis. . . . [P]articularly political motivations which may be
at odds with the profit motive”).
136. Bancec, 462 U.S. 611, 624–25 (1982). In fact, managers of state-owned firms may
occasionally have more discretion than is true for other firms, as there is no market for
corporate shares and civil servants responsible for monitoring managers may have weak
incentives to do so. Saul Estrin, State Ownership, Corporate Governance and Privatization, in
OECD PROCEEDINGS: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES, AND
PRIVATIZATION 11, 15 (1998). Yet the desire to align the entity with political objectives creates
a tendency for government actors to intervene frequently in the management of state-owned
firms. Id. at 16.
137. Estrin, supra note 136, at 17.
138. See SHIRLEY & NELLIS, supra note 126, at 17.
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other benefits to supporters of ruling elites,139 or simply to ensure a
close correspondence between the firm’s activities and the policy
preferences of government officials.140
The control rights attendant to ownership are one mechanism
through which the state ensures that the entity pursues its desired
objectives.141 Yet governments do not need ownership rights to
assert control.142 Saudi Aramco, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’s
state-owned oil company, built a multi-million dollar complex
favored by the royal family, complete with mosque, children’s
camp, museum, and staging ground for a camel beauty contest.143
Was this because the Kingdom is Saudi Aramco’s owner? Its
regulator? Its largest and most important customer?144
In Venezuela, PDVSA enjoys a monopoly on oil and gas
exploitation and has historically generated 95% of the
government’s foreign currency.145 It also has transferred billions of
dollars annually to the government. In 2008, for instance, PDVSA
paid $2 billion in dividends to the government (as shareholder).146
But that is a pittance compared to the $14.7 billion it paid in

139. See, e.g., Maxim Boycko, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A Theory of
Privatization, 106 ECON. J. 309, 309–10 (1996).
140. Muiris MacCarthaigh, Managing State-Owned Enterprises in an Age of Crisis:
An Analysis of the Irish Experience, 32 POL’Y STUD. 215, 217 (2011) (“[P]atronage appointments
by governments to the boards of SOEs have traditionally ensured a direct form of
accountability in relation to policy decisions.”).
141. Thynne, supra note 133, at 184. To an extent, of course, it depends on the baseline.
For instance, governments accustomed to funding and delivering goods and services
through political departments or agencies might view the creation of a state-owned entity as
an intermediate step towards full privatization. Id. at 187. I am referring here to entities in
which governments plan to retain a controlling ownership stake.
142. Again, this is true, although to a lesser extent, of non-sovereign owners.
For instance, a shareholder may also be a customer of the corporation, and it may use its
influence as a customer to influence corporate behavior. See also MUSACCHIO & LAZZARAINI,
supra note 25, at 23–56.
143. Justin Scheck, Bradley Hope & Summer Said, Saudi Aramco Struggles to Disengage
from Royal Family’s Whims, WALL ST. J. (May 25, 2017, 12:12 PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/investors-want-saudi-aramco-to-untangle-itself-fromsaudi-arabiait-wont-be-easy-1495725735.
144. Matt Levine, Aramco Now Comes with Some Numbers, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 13, 2018,
8:28 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2018-04-13/aramco-now-comeswith-some-numbers.
145. Keith Johnson, How Venezuela Struck it Poor, FOREIGN POL’Y
(July 16, 2018, 8:00 AM), http://foreignpolicy.com/2018/07/16/how-venezuela-struck-itpoor-oil-energy-chavez.
146. See PETRÓLEOS DE VENEZ., S.A., LISTING PARTICULARS 42 (2011).
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mandatory “contributions” to various social programs pursuant to
Venezuelan law.147 PDVSA has also provided gas domestically at
exceptionally low prices set by the government.148 It continued
these transfers to the government even as its finances fell into
disrepair and, eventually, it defaulted on billions worth of
obligations to creditors.149
If courts pierce the veil when dividends allow a shareholder to
“systematically withdraw capital . . . without regard to the needs of
the business,”150 should it matter that Venezuela largely eschewed
dividends in favor of subsidized gas and “contributions” to social
programs? If courts view owner domination as a sufficient basis for
veil piercing, what do we make of the fact that, in 2017, the
Venezuelan government arrested senior executives and board
members of CITGO, PDVSA’s U.S. subsidiary, on politicallymotivated corruption charges?151 That is one way to dominate a
corporation, although one that formally results from the exercise of
“sovereign powers”152 rather than corporate control rights.153
I return to these questions below. For now, I note only that, even
when the owner is not a sovereign, it is not obvious why owner
domination matters unless the owner uses its power to achieve an
objective that organizational law seeks to prevent.154 In the
dividend “milking” example, for instance, a shareholder uses
control over the corporation to elevate itself in priority over the
147. Id. at 47.
148. As of July 2018, gas was priced domestically at roughly $0.04 per gallon. See
Johnson, supra note 145.
149. William Neuman & Clifford Krauss, Workers Flee and Thieves Loot Venezuela’s
Reeling Oil Giant, N.Y. TIMES (June 14, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/06/14/world/americas/venezuela-oil-economy.html.
150. PRESSER, supra note 5, at § 1.8; see also Hambleton Bros. Lumber Co. v. Balkin Enter.,
397 F.3d 1217, 1231 n.14 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Piercing . . . based on ‘milking’ of ‘excessive
dividends’ makes sense . . . where corporate assets are systematically and extensively
removed from the corporation.”).
151. Kirk Semple & Clifford Krauss, Politics Shadow Arrests of Citgo Executives in
Venezuela Graft Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 22, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/11/22/world/americas/venezuela-citgo-oil-arrests-corruption.html.
152. Bridas S.A.P.I.C. v. Gov’t of Turkm., 447 F.3d 411, 417 (5th Cir. 2006). Again, the
Bridas court dismissed the exercise of “sovereign powers” as irrelevant to Bancec’s fraud or
injustice test, not to the issue of control. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
153. At least one creditor has argued that these facts warrant treating CITGO Petroleum
as the government’s alter ego. See Complaint at 23, OI Eur. Grp. B.V. v. Bolivarian Republic
of Venez. (D. Del., 2019), (No. 1:19-cv-00290-LPS).
154. Macey & Mitts, supra note 6, at 108.
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entity’s creditors.155 In cases like this, it is the forbidden objective
that justifies veil piercing; control over the corporation is simply the
tool the shareholder uses to accomplish that objective. But
sovereigns have other tools at their disposal.
2. Why do sovereigns need organizational law?
Asset partitioning is the primary economic benefit of limited
liability entities. And of course, economic considerations also
explain why states create and own legally separate entities. Because
they are separate from the state itself, such entities can more easily
pledge assets to obtain financing for development and other
projects.156 Likewise, state-owned entities can waive sovereign
immunity without jeopardizing the state’s own assets.157 However,
here too, sovereign states differ from other shareholders. The
reason is that organizational law’s economic attributes are
inextricably tied to the law of foreign sovereign immunity.
The following discussion explains, in simplified form, how the
U.S. law of foreign sovereign immunity affects the consequences of
a court’s decision to disregard the separate legal status of a stateowned entity. Again, bear in mind that the discussion focuses on
liabilities arising out of commercial activity. Although the
discussion applies generally to other kinds of liability, the rules of
sovereign immunity are somewhat less protective in other contexts
(e.g., expropriation).158
a. Traditional veil piercing; sovereign immunity’s owner-shielding
function. Sovereign states enjoy natural advantages over their
155. Hambleton Bros. Lumber Co. v. Balkin Enters., Inc., 397 F.3d 1217, 1231 n.14
(9th Cir. 2005).
156. Bancec, 462 U.S. 611, 625–26 (1982).
157. See Bank of N.Y. v. Yugoimport, 745 F.3d 599, 614 n.14 (2d Cir. 2014).
158. As noted supra note 47, and more fully discussed below, a creditor whose claim
arises out of commercial activity (and who does not benefit from a waiver of execution
immunity or an arbitration award) cannot attach and execute upon property of a foreign
state used for a commercial activity in the United States without demonstrating that the
property “is or was used for the commercial activity upon which the claim is based.”
28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(2). This requirement of a nexus between the property and the liabilitygenerating activity does not exist in expropriation and other cases. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C.
§ 1610(a)(3) (exception to attachment and execution immunity in expropriation cases). In
these other settings, the FSIA affords less protection to state-owned assets. Despite this
difference, the discussion in the main text applies generally to expropriation and other cases,
as U.S. law still protects the bulk of a foreign state’s property by limiting attachment and
execution to property used for a commercial activity in the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a).
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creditors. To be sure, all potential debtors can engage in judgmentproofing strategies, at a cost.159 But for sovereign states, the
protection is automatic. The state’s most valuable assets are within
its own borders, where they are accessible to creditors only to the
extent its own law and institutions make them available. To escape
these restrictions, foreign creditors must look for attachable
assets abroad.
That task will prove difficult. Under U.S. law, execution
immunity protects property located in the United States and owned
by a foreign sovereign or its political subdivisions.160 This
protection is absolute unless the property is “used for a commercial
activity in the United States.”161 Even when that requirement is
satisfied, a creditor must also show (subject to exceptions) that the
property “is or was used for the commercial activity upon which
the claim is based.”162 Put differently, the default rule is that the
creditor must link the commercial asset it wishes to seize to the
liability-generating activity.163
As noted, there are exceptions, often focused on the nature of
the creditor’s claim (like the exceptions for expropriation in
violation of international law and for state-sponsored terrorism).164

159. Lynn M. LoPucki, The Essential Structure of Judgment Proofing, 51 STAN . L. REV .
147 (1998).
160. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a). The rule in § 1610(a) also applies to a foreign state’s agencies
or instrumentalities (such as state-owned firms), but §1610(b) withdraws attachment and
execution immunity from such entities in additional circumstances.
161. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a).
162. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(2).
163. Although the legislative history on this provision is sparse, the requirement
arguably serves the FSIA’s broader goal of withdrawing immunity to the extent (but only to
the extent) a foreign state enters the market as a commercial actor. See supra note 40 and
accompanying text. Nevertheless, it is somewhat unusual to block a creditor from attaching
unrelated commercial assets, as this protection exceeds that normally afforded to a private
commercial entity, and also exceeds the protection afforded to foreign states under the law
of other countries. See, e.g., State Immunity Act, (1978) § 13(4), HALS. STAT. (UK). Finally, note
that, where a state-owned entity engages in commercial activity in the United States, it
places all of its assets at risk, whether or not used for a commercial activity of any kind.
28 U.S.C. § 1610(b).
164. Leaving aside a creditor’s ability to contract for greater rights (through a waiver
of execution immunity or an arbitration clause), there are several contexts in which U.S. law
lets creditors reach property “used for a commercial activity in the United States” without
demonstrating a link between the property and the claim. These include cases of
state-sponsored terrorism, 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(7); expropriation in violation of
international law, 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(3); judgments establishing rights in certain property,
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These exceptions relieve the creditor of the need to demonstrate a
relationship between the attached property and the liabilitygenerating activity. All the creditor must show is that the property
is used for a commercial activity in the United States. In disputes
arising out of commercial activity, however, the most relevant
exceptions are contract-based. A creditor can avoid the need to
show a link between the property and the liability-generating
activity if it has contracted for a waiver of the sovereign’s execution
immunity.165 The same is true if the creditor has contracted for
arbitration and holds a judgment based on an arbitration award.166
Finally, bear in mind that, outside the United States, execution
immunity sometimes offers less protection. Under U.K. law, for
instance, and with exceptions not relevant here, execution
immunity does not protect property of a foreign state “which is for
the time being in use or intended for use for commercial purposes,”
whether or not there is a link between that property and the
creditor’s claim.167
To see the relevance of these rules to veil piercing disputes,
consider a claim arising out of a state-owned entity’s commercial
activity, where the creditor has bargained for neither a waiver of
execution immunity nor an arbitration clause. In a case like this, veil
piercing has relatively little effect. To be sure, the creditor may now
attach property “used for a commercial activity in the United
States” and owned by the sovereign, rather than by the entity.168
But it will also need to show that the property “is or was used for
the commercial activity” on which it based its claim.169 And most
such property, perhaps all of it, will be housed within the
entity itself.
To make this point concrete, return to the Venezuelan context
and the figure (reprinted below) depicting PDVSA’s corporate
structure. PDVSA’s only U.S. asset consists of shares in the U.S.
holding company that sits atop its oil refining operations in the
country. A creditor of PDVSA who meets the description above
28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(4); and cases in which the property consists of insurance obligations or
proceeds, see 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(5).
165. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(1).
166. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(6).
167. State Immunity Act, (1978) § 13(4), HALS. STAT. (UK).
168. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a).
169. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(2).
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could in all likelihood attach those shares.170 This does not require
disregarding the entity’s separate legal status; the shares belong to
PDVSA. Piercing the corporate veil grants the creditor no
additional access to attachable assets in the United States.171
Assuming the claim relates to PDVSA’s oil operations, the
Venezuelan government has no other U.S. assets that bear the
requisite relationship to the claim.172 This is true even if we ignore
all boundaries imposed by organizational law. For instance, the
government’s equity stake in heavy industry giant CVG will
remain immune from attachment and execution (even if this
interest were located in the United States), as it does not have
the requisite nexus to the creditor’s claim.173 Likewise, the
government and its ministries could engage in unrelated
Venezuela

Protected (though
less so) by sovereign
immunity

Protected by
sovereign immunity

PDVSA

CVG

No sovereign
immunity

U.S. holding and
operating
subsidiaries

Protected (though
less so) by sovereign
immunity

Venezuelan
subsidiaries

May be protected
by sovereign
immunity

170. As an agency or instrumentality of Venezuela, PDVSA’s assets receive less
protection. Assuming the creditor overcomes its immunity from suit, PDVSA’s property is
subject to execution as long as the entity is “engaged in commercial activity in the United
States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1610(b).
171. The result arguably changes if the creditor benefits from a waiver of execution
immunity or arbitration clause. See infra text accompanying notes 176–82.
172. It is possible to imagine cases where veil piercing does place additional U.S. assets
owned by the state at risk. For example, a state-owned entity’s commercial activity outside
the United States may have effects within the country, and in such a case the entity is subject
to suit in the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2). Although the entity may have no U.S.
assets, the sovereign might. And if those assets have a sufficiently close relationship to the
creditor’s claim, execution immunity might not protect them. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(2). An
example might involve actions by a Venezuelan subsidiary of PDVSA that give rise to
liability in the United States. The broader point is simply that veil piercing need not, and
often does not, create additional risks for the sovereign’s U.S. assets.
173. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(2). The example is counterfactual. CVG is a Venezuelan firm
and, to my knowledge, no asset directly owned by the government is located in the
United States.
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commercial and financial transactions in the United States—say,
importing computers, or issuing bonds—without worrying about
creditor interference.
In this scenario—in which the creditor benefits from neither a
waiver of execution immunity nor an arbitration award—the
primary risk to sovereign assets comes from the threat that other
jurisdictions, with less protective immunity rules, might recognize
and enforce the U.S. court’s veil piercing decision. A court in the
United Kingdom, for instance, might treat the question as settled.
In that event, because the State Immunity Act 1978 does not require
a nexus between the asset and the claim, the creditor could reach
property that the state owns and uses for a commercial purpose.174
We might call this risk preclusion risk. It is present when courts
pierce the veil in any context, but it assumes greater significance for
sovereigns given the expansive execution immunity that protects
their U.S. assets in cases arising out of commercial activity. It is
important not to overstate this risk, however, as courts in other
jurisdictions do not automatically recognize judgments of U.S.
courts and in some cases are affirmatively resistant to doing so.175
Finally, note that the threat to sovereign assets may increase
dramatically if the creditor’s contract with the entity includes a
waiver of execution immunity or an arbitration clause. The reason
is that, if a court disregards the entity’s separate legal identity, it
may require the owner to honor the entity’s contractual obligations.
This includes the obligation to arbitrate:
[I]t is clear that the consequence of applying the alter ego doctrine
is that the corporation and those who have controlled it without
regard to its separate entity are treated as but one entity, and at
least in the area of contracts, the acts of one are the acts of all.
There is no reasonable basis for distinguishing between the
parent’s obligation to respond in damages for its instrumentality’s
breach of contract and its obligation to arbitrate the measure of
those damages.176

174. State Immunity Act, (1978) § 13(4), HALS. STAT. (UK).
175. See, e.g., Samuel P. Baumgartner, How Well Do U.S. Judgments Fare in Europe?, 40
GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 173, 184–90 (2008) (summarizing practice in European countries
with respect to recognition and enforcement of U.S. court judgments).
176. Fisser v. Int’l Bank, 282 F.2d 231, 234 (2d Cir. 1960) (citations omitted); see also
Interocean Shipping Co. v. Nat’l Shipping & Trading Corp., 523 F.2d 527, 539 (2d Cir. 1975)
(“In an appropriate situation, the corporate veil may be pierced and a party may be held
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In all likelihood, the same principle means that courts will
impute an entity’s waiver of execution immunity to its owner.177
The consequences of doing so are unclear and depend on questions
of interpretation and timing. As an initial matter, one would think
an entity’s waiver of execution immunity would apply only to
assets owned by the entity. If the sovereign is treated as a party to the
contract, does the scope of the waiver expand to include the vastly
larger pool of assets owned by the sovereign? Does the answer
depend on whether the veil piercing decision is based on facts in
existence at the time of contract formation? These questions do not
have clear answers, but the implications are significant. If the
entity’s waiver of execution immunity is imputed to the sovereign
and construed to apply to all non-immune assets, then the creditor
will be able to attach and execute upon property even when there
is no link between the property and the commercial activity
underlying its claim.178 Returning to the Venezuelan example, a
creditor of PDVSA armed with a waiver of execution immunity
might attach the proceeds of a sovereign bond issuance in the
United States, even though the proceeds are unrelated to oil
extraction and refining.179 As noted, this result is possible,
but not certain, when the entity has agreed to a waiver of

bound to arbitrate as the signatory’s alter ego.”); Thomson-CSF, S.A. v. Am. Arb. Ass’n,
64 F.3d 773, 777 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting that parent corporation can be bound by the arbitration
clause in a subsidiary’s contract if the relationship between the entities is “sufficiently close
as to justify piercing the corporate veil”).
177. See Kensington Int’l. Ltd. v. Republic of Congo, 2007 WL 1032269 at *15, No. 03
Civ. 4578 LAP (Mar. 30, 2007) (imputing waiver of immunity in loan agreement executed by
government to subsequently created state-owned corporation found to be government’s
alter ego); EM Ltd. v. Banco Central de la Republica Argentina, 800 F.3d 78, 96 (2d Cir. 2015)
(“BCRA does not constitute Argentina’s ‘alter ego’ for the purposes of this suit. Argentina’s
express waiver of its own sovereign immunity in the FAA, therefore, may not be imputed
to BCRA.”).
178. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1610(a)(1), (6).
179. The issuance of bonds is undoubtedly a commercial act. See Republic of Argentina
v. Weltover, 504 U.S. 607, 614–15 (1992). Whether the proceeds are immune depends largely
on whether the government uses the proceeds—or the intangible contract right to receive
them—for a commercial activity in the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a); cf. Aurelius Capital
Partners v. Republic of Argentina, 584 F.3d 120, 131 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding that funds held
in the United States by legally-separate private corporations, which were to be transferred to
Argentine government entities, were immune from execution because “a sovereign’s mere
transfer to a governmental entity of legal control over an asset does not qualify the property
as being ‘used for a commercial activity’” in the United States).
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execution immunity. When the entity has agreed to arbitrate, the
result is effectively mandated by the FSIA.180
To conclude, in the traditional veil piercing setting:
•

In cases that originate from the commercial activities of
a state-owned entity, the law of sovereign immunity
protects the state in ways that approximate, and often
exceed, the protection offered by limited liability. The
owner-shielding benefits of a limited liability rule are
much reduced.

•

One risk to the sovereign’s assets stems from what we
might call preclusion risk—i.e., the risk that later
tribunals will treat the veil piercing question as settled
in contexts where the law of sovereign immunity offers
less protection.

•

The risk to the sovereign’s assets increases
dramatically in cases where the entity’s contract
includes provisions that, if imputed to the sovereign,
will diminish the default protections of sovereign
immunity law. To put the point a bit differently,
limited liability is most important because it partitions
contracts, not assets.

•

Finally, in other settings, such as those arising from an
expropriation in violation of international law,
creditors need not show a nexus between the asset and
the liability-generating activity.181 Here, limited
liability does more owner-shielding work, although the
law of foreign sovereign immunity still protects most
sovereign assets.

b. “Reverse” veil piercing; the more prominent role of organizational
law. In the reverse veil piercing setting like Bancec, where a creditor
180. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(6), property used for a commercial activity in the United
States is not immune from execution if “the judgment is based on an order confirming an
arbitral award rendered against the foreign state [including its agencies or instrumentalities],
provided that attachment in aid of execution, or execution, would not be inconsistent with
any provision in the arbitral agreement.” If the arbitration agreement is accompanied by a
waiver of execution immunity, it is possible that both provisions might be interpreted
together to limit the creditor’s execution rights to property housed in the entity. Otherwise,
the creditor may attach any property used for a commercial activity in the United States.
181. See supra notes 158, 165.
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of the sovereign seeks to impute liability to a state-owned entity, or
attach the entity’s assets, organizational law does more work. To
begin with, many state-owned or state-controlled entities are not
entitled to sovereign immunity. Under U.S. law, an entity can assert
sovereign immunity only if it qualifies as an agency or
instrumentality of a foreign state.182 To meet the definition, the
entity must have been created under a law that entitles it to separate
legal status, must be “neither a citizen of a State of the United
States . . . nor created under the laws of any third country,” and
must either be majority-owned by a foreign state or qualify as an
“organ” of the state.183 The majority-ownership prong requires the
state to directly own a majority stake.184 This excludes many entities
subject to meaningful state control, including subsidiaries of stateowned entities.185 To qualify as a state organ, the entity must
demonstrate that it “acts as an instrument” of the state—i.e., that it
is subject to significant state control.186 If this sounds like the test for
alter ego liability, it isn’t—or at least courts often appear to
understand it differently. The level of control needed for an entity
to qualify as an “organ” appears to be less than the level needed to
pierce the corporate veil.187
182. The term “foreign state” also includes political subdivisions. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a).
In addition, courts sometimes equate the state with entities that seem to meet the definition
of “agency or instrumentality” when these entities serve core governmental functions.
See TMR Energy Ltd. v. State Prop. Fund of Ukr., 411 F.3d 296, 300 (D.C. Cir. 2005);
Garb v. Republic of Pol., 440 F.3d 579, 594 (2d Cir. 2006).
183. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1603(b)(2)–(3).
184. See generally Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468 (2003).
185. Id. Post-Dole, most courts take the view that subsidiaries of a state-owned entity
can qualify as organs of a foreign state. See Phillip Riblett, A Legal Regime for State-Owned
Companies in the Modern Era, 18 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 1, 17 (2008); Janvey v. Libyan Inv.
Auth., 840 F.3d 248, 259–60 (5th Cir. 2016) (per curiam); USX Corp. v. Adriatic Ins. Co., 345
F.3d 190, 199–216 (3d Cir. 2003); Cal. Dep’t of Water Res. v. Powerex Corp., 533 F.3d 1087,
1097–102 (9th Cir. 2008); Corporacion Mexicana De Mantenimiento Integral v. PemexExploracion Y Produccion, 832 F.3d 92, 116 (2d Cir. 2016) (concurring opinion by Winter, J.).
But see Allen v. Russian Fed’n, 522 F. Supp. 2d 167, 183–84 (D.D.C. 2007) (apparently reading
Dole v. Patrickson to establish that remote subsidiaries cannot meet the definition of “agency
or instrumentality”).
186. See Dewhurst v. Telenor Inv. AS, 83 F. Supp. 2d 577, 594–95 (D. Md. 2000).
187. See, e.g., Janvey, 840 F.3d at 259 (per curiam) (“Considering whether an entity is an
‘organ’ is, in some respects, similar to considering whether it is an ‘agent.’” (emphasis added));
U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Braspetro Oil Services Co., 1999 WL 307666, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)
(apparently viewing Bancec’s alter ego theory as requiring a greater level of control than the
test for whether an entity is an “organ” of a foreign state); Gen. Star Nat. Ins. Co. v.
Administratia Asigurarilor de Stat, 713 F. Supp. 2d 267, 276 & n.8 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)
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Of course, if an entity cannot assert sovereign immunity, it
relies entirely on organizational law to shield it from its owner’s
creditors (and from creditors of affiliated entities). But even if the
entity can assert sovereign immunity, its property is generally
“more amenable to attachment” than property owned by the state
itself.188 If it is engaged in commercial activity in the United States
then, in most cases, the entity’s creditors can reach any of its
property in the United States,189 at least in an action brought by one
of its own creditors.
In an action by one of the state’s creditors, matters become less
clear. If the entity is viewed as an alter ego of the state, the question
is whether the more protective immunity rules applicable to the
state determine the scope of immunity. I have found few cases that
address the question, but those that do reason—correctly, in my
view—that the sovereign’s immunities apply.190 But even under
this approach, ignoring the entity’s separate legal status necessarily
places at risk assets that would otherwise have been available only
to the entity’s creditors.191 Thus, state-owned entities always gain
some protection from organizational law.
In summary:
•

Notwithstanding the law of sovereign immunity,
organizational law plays an important entity-shielding
role for state-owned entities.

(noting that proof sufficient to demonstrate that an entity was an organ of a foreign state
would not suffice to demonstrate that the entity was also the state’s alter ego).
188. Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 637 F.3d 783, 794 (7th Cir. 2011).
189. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(b).
190. Af-Cap, Inc. v. Chevron Overseas (Congo) Ltd., 475 F.3d 1080, 1095 (9th Cir. 2007)
(“Af–Cap asserts that as an instrumentality of the Congo, SNPC’s immunity from execution
is governed by the standard prescribed in . . . § 1610(b), . . . rather than the more restrictive
standard of § 1610(a), . . . Af–Cap’s contention is unavailing because . . . SNPC was an alter
ego of the Congo, and an alter ego is not a ‘separate legal entity.’”); Crystallex Int’l Corp. v.
Bolivarian Republic of Venez., 333 F. Supp. 3d 380, 395 (D. Del. 2018) (“[A]s the Court is
treating PDVSA as Venezuela, and therefore treating the property of PDVSA as the property
of Venezuela, Crystallex must satisfy the narrower exception to execution immunity
applicable to property of foreign states.”).
191. As in the traditional veil piercing context, a waiver of sovereign immunity in the
sovereign’s contracts with its creditors can also be imputed to the entity. See Kensington Int’l
Ltd. v. Republic of Congo, No. 03 Civ. 4578 LAP, 2007 WL 1032269 at *15 (S.D.N.Y Mar. 30,
2007) (imputing waiver of immunity in loan agreement executed by government to
subsequently-created state-owned corporation found to be government’s alter ego).
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•

Even when applicable, sovereign immunity offers less
protection to entities owned or controlled by foreign
states. The extent of this protection is unclear in
“reverse” veil piercing cases, but disregarding the
entity’s separate legal status will place at least some
entity assets at risk.
II. IMPLICATIONS

Even if organizational law added nothing to the law of foreign
sovereign immunity—and that is clearly not so—it will remain
relevant to state-owned entities. The FSIA anticipated that courts
would continue to grapple with questions of organizational law192
and did not purport to instruct them how to handle such
questions.193 It is a given, however, that the protections offered by
limited liability entities must yield where the corporate form is
used to subvert important policies in the enforcing jurisdiction.194
The FSIA is the primary statute governing U.S. courts’ use of legal
coercion against foreign states.195 It sets the terms on which foreign
states may engage in commerce within the United States (or in
ways that affect the United States), and it defines the assets they
must put at risk to do so.196 And it should inform the application of
organizational law in this context.
192. According to the authoritative House report: “The bill is not intended to affect . . .
the attribution of responsibility between or among entities of a foreign state . . . .” H.R. REP.
NO. 94-1487, at 12 (1976). Later amendments to the statute designed to address cases of statesponsored terrorism also recognize the continued relevance of organizational law—for
example, by explicitly abrogating Bancec’s presumption of independence in certain cases. See,
e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1610(g) (allowing creditors holding judgments against a foreign state in
certain terrorism-related cases to seize property held by state agencies and instrumentalities
notwithstanding the Bancec factors).
193. See Joseph W. Dellapenna, Interpreting the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: Reading
or Construing the Text?, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 555, 568 (2011). Moreover, organizational
law inevitably affects the application of other immunity rules, such as the rule that an entity
can qualify as an “agency or instrumentality” of a foreign state under the majority-ownership
prong of 28 U.S.C. § 1603 only if it is directly owned by the state. Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson,
538 U.S. 468, 473 (2003).
194. Bancec, 462 U.S. 611, 630 (1982).
195. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 12 (noting the FSIA “sets forth the sole and
exclusive standards to be used in resolving questions of sovereign immunity . . . before
Federal and State courts in the United States”).
196. See Kensington, 2007 WL 1032269, at * 16. A foreign sovereign is not immune from
suit in U.S. courts in lawsuits based on commercial activity within the United States, on acts
within the United States in connection with commercial activity elsewhere, and on acts that
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A. When (and Why) Does a Foreign State’s Control Over an
Entity Matter?
In this Section, I ask how courts should think about the control
factor in veil piercing decisions. That inquiry involves two
questions. The first relates to the alter ego theory, which permits
veil piercing upon a finding of complete owner domination,
potentially without regard to whether the owner’s use of control
causes an injury to creditors.197 Can this alter ego theory be
defended (and limited) in any principled way? Second, should it
matter whether the sovereign’s control over the entity stems from
its rights as owner, rather than as sovereign?
To preface that discussion, it is important to distinguish veil
piercing questions from questions associated with agency law
principles. For example, a party who contracts with a state-owned
entity might seek to hold the state liable on the theory that the state
authorized the entity to act on its behalf.198 In the discussion to
follow, I set agency law theories aside, for they raise different
questions.199 Even if it is appropriate to impute the entity’s conduct
to the state on agency-law grounds,200 the reasons have nothing to

occur elsewhere in connection with non-U.S. commercial activity but that cause a direct effect
in the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2).
197. Courts have rejected the need to demonstrate any link between state control and
the plaintiff’s injury. Crystallex Int’l Corp. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venez., 932 F.3d 126,
141–42 (3d Cir. 2019). But they have left open the possibility that there must be an underlying
equitable justification for an alter ego ruling. Id. at 146. The uncertainty perhaps reflects a
broader uncertainty about whether veil piercing is itself a legal or equitable doctrine.
See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 14, at 480 n.4 (2001); Sam F. Halabi, Veil-Piercing’s Procedure,
67 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 1001, 1016 (2015).
198. Transamerica Leasing, Inc. v. La Republica de Venezuela, 200 F.3d 843, 849
(D.C. Cir. 2000).
199. In general, an agency relationship exists only if the principal has authorized the
agent-entity to act on its behalf and has the right to direct the agent’s conduct. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (AM. L. INST. 2006) (“Agency is the fiduciary
relationship that arises when one person (a ‘principal’) manifests assent to another person
(an ‘agent’) that the agent shall act on the principal’s behalf and subject to the principal’s
control, and the agent manifests assent or otherwise consents so to act.” (emphasis omitted)).
200. Only a few courts have interpreted Bancec “broadly to include not only corporate
principles but also common-law rules of agency.” RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 452 reporter’s note n. 7 (AM. L. INST., Tentative Draft
No. 3, 2017). However, I am aware of no courts that have rejected the application of agency
law principles to state-owned entities. In such cases, liability is also consistent with
international law, which attributes the actions of a legally-separate entity to its state owner
when the state “has authorized an act, or has exercised direction and control over it.”
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do with organizational law. In such cases, liability follows not
because the government has abused the corporate form but because
the government has authorized the agent to act on its behalf.201
The clarification is minor but necessary, because courts
applying the alter ego theory often refer to dominated entities as
“agents” of the state without intending to invoke agency law.
Bancec is an early example. Recall that the Court’s alter ego test
covers situations “where a corporate entity is so extensively
controlled by its owner that a relationship of principal and agent is
created.”202 Despite the reference to a principal-agent relationship,
it is clear that the Court in fact “applied a veil piercing or ‘alter ego’
analysis.”203 The same is true of most cases involving state-owned
entities, notwithstanding occasional references to agency law.204
For the sake of doctrinal clarity, it would be best for courts to clearly
“distinguish situations in which liability is imposed . . . because of
the existence of the agency relation, in our common-law
understanding of that relation, from cases in which the corporate
veil . . . is pierced for other reasons of policy.”205 The latter

Int’l L. Comm’n, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts,
with Commentaries, Art. 8 cmt. 8, 2001.
201. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (AM. L. INST. 2006).
202. Bancec, 462 U.S. 611, 629 (1982)
203. RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 452 reporter’s note n. 7 (AM. L. INST., Tentative Draft No. 3, 2017).
204. This tendency also exists in cases involving traditional corporations. As the
Reporter’s Note to the Restatement (Second) of Agency § 14M puts it:
Unfortunately, however, the courts have not always observed the distinction
between these two separate bases for parent’s liability. When liability is fastened
upon the parent it is said that the subsidiary is a “mere agent.” The result has been
a weakening and muddying of the term “agent” and a failure by courts to state the
real reasons for their decisions.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 14M reporter’s note (AM. L. INST. 1958). Some cases do
analyze agencies theories separately in the sovereign context. See, e.g., Transamerica Inc. v.
La Republica de Venez., 200 F.3d 843, 849–50 (D.C. Cir. 2000); S & Davis Int’l, Inc. v. Yemen,
218 F.3d 1292, 1299 (11th Cir. 2000). However, even in these exceptions, the analysis of agency
law often collapses into an “alter ego” inquiry into domination, as the court investigates
whether the sovereign observed traditional corporate formalities. Thus, in S & Davis
International, the court’s agency-law discussion references the lack of proof that the stateowned entity had “papers of incorporation and corporate structure, . . . a board of
directors[,] . . . financial accounts in its own name,” etc. S & Davis Int’l, 218 F.3d at 1299.
205. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 14M reporter’s note (AM. L. INST. 1958). Note
that the FSIA may not permit jurisdiction over foreign states based on a theory of apparent
authority. Compare First Fid. Bank v. Gov’t of Ant. & Barb., 877 F.2d 189 (2d Cir. 1989)
(recognizing jurisdiction based on apparent authority), with Phaneuf v. Republic of Indon.,
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(and larger) subset of veil piercing cases is the subject of the
discussion below.
1. A more principled justification for the alter ego theory
Bancec’s alter ego theory permits veil piercing where an entity
is “so extensively controlled by its owner that a relationship of
principal and agent is created.”206 The disjunctive test is somewhat
unusual; as noted, when faced with a non-sovereign shareholder,
courts sometimes frame the inquiry in disjunctive terms but
typically recognize that control alone will not suffice unless the
control results in some harm to third parties.207 In the sovereign
context, however, courts routinely emphasize that “domination” of
the entity will suffice to disregard the separate legal personhood of
a government instrumentality.208
Despite embracing the alter ego theory, Bancec offered no
explicit rationale for why extensive control, without more, justifies
disregarding the entity’s separate legal status. Moreover, as in the
traditional context involving non-sovereign owners, the multifactor tests courts invoke to guide alter ego analysis can border on
the incoherent.209 For instance, no policy of importance to U.S. law
is implicated by a foreign state’s failure to observe “ordinary
106 F.3d 302 (9th Cir. 1997) (ruling that the commercial activity exception to sovereign
immunity requires a showing of actual authority).
206. Bancec, 462 U.S. at 629. Although Bancec’s articulation of the control inquiry refers
to the creation of a principal-agent relationship, it “is in fact most similar to the ‘alter ego’ or
‘piercing the corporate veil’ standards applied . . . to determine whether the actions of a
corporation are attributable to its owners.” Doe v. Holy See, 557 F.3d 1066, 1080 (9th Cir.
2009). In principle, agency law is distinct and potentially allows for liability in situations
where an alter ego theory would not. Transamerica, 200 F.3d at 849. However, the cases often
blend the inquiry together. See Bridas S.A.P.I.C. v. Gov’t of Turkm. (Bridas I), 345 F.3d 347,
358 (5th Cir. 2003); Walter Fuller Aircraft Sales, Inc. v. Republic of Phil., 965 F.2d 1375, 1382
(5th Cir. 1992).
207. See supra notes 74, 109.
208. See Alejandre v. Telefonica Larga Distancia, de P.R., Inc., 183 F.3d 1277, 1284
(11th Cir. 1999) (“[W]hen a corporate entity is so extensively controlled by its owner that a
relationship of principal and agent is created, the [Bancec] Court observed that one may be
held liable for the actions of the other.”); Dewhurst v. Telenor Inv. AS, 83 F. Supp. 2d 577,
589 (D. Md. 2000) (noting that, although parent corporation had no completely controlled
subsidiary, “the court may pierce the corporate veil if doing so would avoid fraud or
injustice”); DRC, Inc. v. Republic of Hond., 71 F. Supp. 3d 201, 214–17 (D.D.C. 2014);
LNC Invs., Inc. v. Republic of Nicar., 115 F. Supp. 2d 358, 365–66 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (noting
fraud or injustice as a separate ground for piercing the corporate veil).
209. See supra notes 75–76 and accompanying text.
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corporate formalities.”210 Nor is it helpful to observe that a stateowned entity’s “profits go to the government.”211 Because foreign
states will often be extensively involved in entity operations,212 the
risk is that Bancec’s alter ego test will withdraw the protections of
limited liability when doing so advances no discernible policy
embedded in U.S. law.
Despite this risk, it is possible to confine Bancec’s alter ego test
to an appropriate set of cases. The majority opinion in Bancec
explicitly links veil piercing to cases in which the corporate form
“is interposed to defeat legislative policies.”213 And, without trying
to define the full set of relevant statutory policies, the majority
opinion makes clear that the FSIA plays a central role. Thus, the
Bancec majority emphasized that a decision to respect Bancec’s
separate legal status would let the Cuban government “obtain relief
in our courts that it could not obtain in its own right without
waiving its sovereign immunity and answering for” its
expropriation of the defendant’s assets.214 The Cuban government
was the real beneficiary of the U.S. lawsuit.215 But if Cuba itself had
sued U.S. courts, Citibank could have filed a counterclaim, at least
for an amount up to the value of the Cuban claim.216 Cuba’s
decision to interpose a nominally separate entity as plaintiff sought
to escape the FSIA’s judgment that a foreign state “should not
obtain the benefits of litigation before U.S. courts while avoiding
any legal liabilities claimed against it and arising from that same
transaction or occurrence.”217 Under the circumstances, to respect
the entity’s separate legal status “would permit governments to

210. Kirschenbaum v. 650 Fifth Ave. & Related Props., 830 F.3d 107, 130 (2d Cir. 2016).
211. Crystallex Int’l Corp. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venez., 932 F.3d 126, 148 (3d Cir.
2019). The fact that the Third Circuit devoted only three sentences to this issue suggests the
court recognized the inanity of the question, derived from the Supreme Court’s opinion in
Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 138 S. Ct. 816 (2018).
212. Infra Section II.B.
213. Bancec, 462 U.S. 611, 630 (1982).
214. Id. at 632.
215. Id.
216. 28 U.S.C. § 1607 (permitting setoff up to this amount and also allowing
counterclaims in a greater amount when the counterclaim arises out of the same transaction
or occurrence or when the sovereign otherwise lacks immunity); Nat’l City Bank of N.Y. v.
Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356, 364 (1955) (“It is recognized that a counterclaim based on
the subject matter of a sovereign’s suit is allowed to cut into the doctrine of immunity.”).
217. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 23 (1976).
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avoid the requirements of international law simply by creating
juridical entities whenever the need arises.”218
Bancec’s specific holding is tied to the rule that a foreign
government that files suit in U.S. courts waives sovereign
immunity with regard to certain counterclaims.219 But the principle
is a broader one. A foreign state’s control over an entity matters,
and justifies an alter ego finding, when the state uses this control to
subvert the FSIA’s statutory scheme. In cases arising out of
commercial activity, perhaps the most fundamental policy of the
FSIA is that foreign sovereigns, and their agencies and
instrumentalities, should not leverage immunity to gain unfair
advantages over private commercial enterprises. This logic
underpinned the shift from absolute to restrictive immunity under
international law and motivated the U.S. government’s embrace of
restrictive immunity in 1952.220 At minimum, the logic requires
foreign states and state-owned entities engaged in commercial
activities affecting the United States to place at risk assets
associated with those activities.221
In at least two scenarios, a state’s control over an entity may
come into conflict with this requirement. First, the state’s control
may be such that it is effectively able to direct the entity’s day-today commercial activity.222 When this is the case, there is no reason
to treat the entity’s assets as distinct from those belonging to the
state itself. To draw that distinction is to permit the state to use the
corporate form to circumvent the FSIA.223 Second, even if the state

218. Bancec, 462 U.S. at 633.
219. 28 U.S.C. § 1607.
220. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
ch. 5, subch. A, intro. note (AM. LAW INST. 1987) (“[A]s governments increasingly engaged in
state-trading and various commercial activities, . . . immunity deprived private parties that
dealt with a state of their judicial remedies, and gave states an unfair advantage in
competition with private commercial enterprise.”); Competence of Courts in Regard to Foreign
States, Comment to art. 11, 26 AM. J. INT’L L. 451, 598 (Supp. 1932) (“[W]hen a State engages in
business in competition with private persons or corporations, this competition is unfair if the
State is not answerable in the courts of the State where the business is transacted.”).
221. 28 U.S.C. § 1610.
222. As noted, agency-law principles might also support liability in some of these cases.
See supra note 199.
223. In many such cases, ignoring the corporate form will also have little effect. When
an entity’s conduct is imputed to the state itself, recall that sovereign immunity will rarely
allow the creditor to reach state assets not related to the liability-generating activity. See supra
notes 169–170 and accompanying text.

840

3.WEIDEMAIER_FIN.NH (DO NOT DELETE)

841

3/27/2021 1:47 AM

Piercing the (Sovereign) Veil

is not directly involved in a particular commercial activity, its
domination of the entity may be so complete that it is impossible to
distinguish the state’s assets and liabilities from those of the entity.
Here, domination permits both the state and the entity to
opportunistically manipulate assets and liabilities to the
disadvantage of creditors. In such a case, veil piercing is
appropriate to prevent such opportunism.
One might object that I am treating Bancec’s test as conjunctive,
requiring domination and fraud, rather than disjunctive. That is not
what Bancec says, and it is not how most courts understand
Bancec.224 But instead I am suggesting that, fairly read, Bancec
understands the alter ego theory to be confined to a narrow set of
cases in which the owner’s domination creates opportunities to
subvert the FSIA. If that reading seems to conflict with the formal
test articulated in Bancec, the tension dissolves upon careful reading
of the cases, which tend to respect an entity’s separate legal status
unless doing so would allow the sovereign to exploit the corporate
form in some way relevant to the purposes of sovereign immunity
law.225 Nevertheless, the cases are dominated by lengthy inquiries
into the sovereign’s day-to-day control over the enterprise, without
much discussion of whether this control implicates the policies
underlying the FSIA.226 Because states will often be extensively
224. However, courts do occasionally acknowledge that an alter-ego ruling may
require an underlying equitable justification. See supra note 197.
225. See, e.g., Bancec, 462 U.S. 611, 633 (1982) (“Cuba cannot escape liability for acts in
violation of international law simply by retransferring the assets to separate juridical
entities.”); Kalamazoo Spice, 616 F. Supp. at 666 (attributing entity’s U.S. contacts to the
Ethiopian government, which had expropriated the plaintiff’s majority stake in the entity,
because to do otherwise would let the government immunize itself from liability while using
the entity as a front “to profit from its commercial activities in the United States”); S & Davis
Int’l, Inc. v. Republic of Yemen, 218 F.3d 1292 (11th Cir. 2000) (basing veil piercing decision
on a finding that an agency relationship existed, when a government ministry had effectively
led the state-owned entity’s counterparty to believe it was contracting directly with the
government); McKesson Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 52 F.3d 346 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
(holding that state-owned entity and the government were in agency relationship in case
where the government had attracted foreign investors to contribute capital and expertise to
the entity and then expropriated that investment).
226. Kirschenbaum v. 650 Fifth Ave. & Related Props., 830 F.3d 107, 130 (2d Cir. 2016)
(plaintiffs’ evidence is “insufficient to demonstrate Iran’s disregard for Alavi’s separate
corporate form much less Iran’s exercise of day-to-day control over Alavi”) (citation omitted);
Transamerica v. Venezuela, 200 F.3d 843, 848 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (“[C]ontrol is relevant when it
significantly exceeds the normal supervisory control exercised by any corporate parent over
its subsidiary and, indeed, amounts to complete domination . . . .”); Dewhurst v. Telenor
Invest AS, 83 F. Supp. 2d 577, 589–90 (D. Md. 2000) (noting that plaintiffs had not shown
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involved in firm affairs,227 this inquiry risks producing results that
undermine the statute. One improvement, then, would be to make
clear that it is the use of control to subvert the FSIA that justifies an
alter ego finding, not the mere fact of owner domination.
2. Control as sovereign versus control as owner
A second implication relates to the manner in which the
sovereign wields control. Veil piercing doctrine has been roundly
criticized as incoherent even when the owner is not a sovereign.228
Multi-factor inquiries into whether the shareholder kept adequate
records and observed other formalities seem disconnected from
any relevant policy. But in the sovereign context, this inquiry
becomes even more artificial.229 When applying the alter ego
doctrine, courts routinely insist that what matters is whether the
government inserts itself into the day-to-day operations of the
entity,230 examining organizational structure, corporate formalities,
and other familiar (if criticized) factors.231 But sovereigns have
many ways to control state-owned entities.232 The fact of control
matters, not the source.
In general, the cases are consistent with this proposition. For
example, in declining to respect PDVSA’s separate legal status,
neither the district court nor the court of appeals distinguished
between the dividends, taxes, royalty payments, legally-mandated

evidence of extensive control and that the parent and subsidiary corporations “maintain their
own separate accounting books and records, as well as conduct their own Board meetings.”);
Doe v. Holy See, 557 F.3d 1066, 1079 (9th Cir. 2009) (noting that plaintiff “does not allege
day-to-day, routine involvement of the Holy See in the affairs of the Archdiocese”); DRC,
Inc. v. Republic of Hond., 71 F. Supp. 3d 201, 215 (D.D.C. 2014) (noting that FHIS “appears
to enjoy significant autonomy in the conduct of its daily operations”).
227. See supra Sections I.A.2–3.
228. See supra note 78.
229. See Bridas I, 345 F.3d 347, 360 n.11 (5th Cir. 2003) (listing twenty-one separate
factors for the district court potentially to consider on remand).
230. See, e.g., EM Ltd. v. Banco Central de la Republica Arg., 800 F.3d 78, 91
(2d Cir. 2015); Holy See, 557 F.3d at 1079 (9th Cir. 2009); Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, 905 F.2d 438, 447–48 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Hester Int’l. Corp. v. Federal Republic
of Nigeria, 879 F.2d 170, 179–80 (5th Cir. 1989).
231. Walter Fuller Aircraft Sales, Inc. v. Republic of Phil., 965 F.2d 1375, 1382
(5th Cir. 1992) (“[W]e look to the ownership and management structure of the
instrumentality, paying particularly close attention to whether the government is involved
in day-to-day operations . . . .”).
232. See supra Section I.B.1.
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contributions, and other mechanisms by which the Venezuelan
government extracted value from the firm.233 Some cases, however,
arguably imply a need to distinguish acts the sovereign takes as
owner from acts it takes as sovereign. In Bridas II, for example, the
court refused to consider the government’s imposition of an export
ban targeting a foreign-owned corporation in evaluating whether
respecting the entity’s separate legal status would result in fraud or
injustice.234 Despite acknowledging that the government imposed
the ban “[t]o force Bridas’s submission” to its demand for more
money,235 the court dismissed the export ban as an act taken in the
exercise of “sovereign powers . . . not a wrong based on misuse of
the corporate organizational form.”236
One can interpret this as a statement about causation: the export
ban’s harm was independent of—neither caused nor exacerbated
by—the government’s ownership rights over the entity. So
understood, the court correctly disregarded the ban. If a
shareholder robs a corporation’s creditor at gunpoint, why should
this justify disregarding the corporate form? However, Bridas II
arguably implies a bit more—that the creditor must point to a
specific misuse of the government’s power as owner.237 But it
makes little sense to distinguish between powers exercised as
sovereign and powers exercised as owner. The decision to pierce
the corporate veil implies nothing about the validity of the
sovereign’s public acts, nor does it require the court to make any
other determination forbidden under U.S. law.238 The relevant

233. Crystallex Int’l Corp. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venez., 333 F. Supp. 3d 380, 409–11
(D. Del. 2018); Crystallex Int’l Corp. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venez., 932 F.3d 126, 146–48
(3d Cir. 2019).
234. Bridas II, 447 F.3d 411, 417 (5th Cir. 2006).
235. Id. at 415.
236. Id. at 417.
237. Id. at 416 (asserting that Bridas “had to demonstrate that the Government used its
control over Turkmenneft to commit a ‘fraud or injustice’”). Likewise, in discussing Bancec’s
alter ego prong, the court emphasized that “the [g]overnment . . . exercised its power as a
parent entity to deprive Bridas of a contractual remedy.” Id. at 420; see also First Inv. Corp. of
the Marshall Islands v. Fujian Mawei Shipbuilding, Ltd., 703 F.3d 742, 755 (5th Cir. 2012)
(citing Bridas II and noting that “it is not sufficient for it merely to point out an injustice that
would result from an adverse decision. Rather, [the creditor] must show how the [sovereign]
manipulated [the entity’s] corporate form to perpetuate a fraud or injustice”).
238. The act of state doctrine generally prevents federal courts declaring invalid an
official act taken by a foreign state within its own territory. See W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v.
Env’t Tectonics Corp., Int’l., 493 U.S. 400, 405 (1990). But by its terms, the doctrine would not
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question is whether, by interposing the entity between itself and a
creditor, the sovereign seeks to subvert the FSIA, enrich itself at a
creditor’s expense, or accomplish some other forbidden purpose.239
There is no meaningful difference between, say, a dividend
payment that leaves a state-owned corporation insolvent and a
confiscatory tax (or mandatory contribution to social programs)
that produces the same result. In both cases, a decision to respect
the corporate form would allow the sovereign to reap the benefits
of limited liability while inverting the usual priority structure, in
which the corporation’s creditors have a prior claim.240 Again, it is
the fact of control, and the purpose for which the state uses control,
that matters.
B. Implications for Traditional and “Reverse” Veil Piercing Cases
As explained in Part II, imputing a state-owned entity’s
liabilities to the state itself need not have dire consequences.241
Because of foreign sovereign immunity, states do not rely as
heavily on organizational law to shield their assets from claims by
creditors of the entity. Of course, the fact that a creditor has asked
the court to pierce the veil implies that the creditor perceives some
benefit from this remedy. Moreover, Bancec’s concern for comity
and reciprocity suggests that veil piercing should remain the
exception, not the rule.242 Nevertheless, the consequences of veil
piercing often will be relatively modest. Despite the natural
reluctance to impose liability on a foreign state, courts may in fact
be too reluctant to pierce the veil.
This is especially true when the creditor has not bargained for
an arbitration clause or a waiver of execution immunity.243 In that
case, the primary risk is that future courts will treat the veil piercing
forbid a court to use such an act as a basis for disregarding the separate legal status of a
state-owned entity.
239. See, e.g., DRC, Inc. v. Republic of Hond., 71 F. Supp. 3d 201, 218 (D.D.C. 2014).
240. In places, Bridas II appears to recognize that acts taken in the exercise of “sovereign
powers” can justify disregarding the entity’s separate legal status. Thus, the court
emphasized not only that the government had substituted a thinly-capitalized entity for the
original state counterparty, but that it had also passed laws immunizing many of the new
entity’s assets from seizure and limiting the government’s own exposure to liability.
Bridas II, 477 F.3d at 417, 420.
241. See supra notes 170–73 and accompanying text.
242. See supra note 92.
243. See supra notes 176–78 and accompanying text.
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issue as settled in a setting where the consequences to the sovereign
are much more dramatic—as when a creditor asks a court to give
preclusive effect to a veil piercing ruling in a jurisdiction where the
law of sovereign immunity offers less protection.244 But this result
is not required. Courts outside the United States do not
automatically recognize the judgments of U.S. courts245 and may be
especially unlikely to do so in settings where recognition involves
significant stakes for foreign governments. Even under U.S. law,
preclusion doctrine is sufficiently flexible for courts to deny
preclusive effect to a finding made in a lawsuit that involved
significantly lower stakes.246 Again, I am not suggesting that veil
piercing should be routine, nor advocating for a doctrine that looks
materially different from the normal setting involving nonsovereign shareholders. But to the extent that courts view veil
piercing as especially problematic in the sovereign context, they
should recognize that this instinct may overstate the importance of
organizational law in protecting sovereign assets.247
However, matters look quite different when a creditor of the
sovereign seeks to reach assets belonging to a state-owned entity.
Concerns for comity and reciprocity are still relevant. But because
sovereign immunity does not afford state-owned entities the same
protections,248 organizational law plays a more important role in
preserving the entity’s access to credit and in allowing foreign
states to pursue economic development and other objectives.249
This is obvious when an entity is neither majority-owned by a
244. See supra notes 174–75 and accompanying text.
245. Baumgartner, supra note 175.
246. Under U.S. law, for example, a court’s decision to pierce the veil will not
automatically benefit another creditor (i.e., not the creditor who obtained the judgment). In
such cases, preclusion turns on whether the defendant had sufficient incentive to litigate in
the first action. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 330–31 (1979).
247. In addition, state-owned entities may bargain for additional protection for their
sovereign owners. Bond indentures, for instance, commonly include “no recourse against
others” clauses protecting shareholders and other third parties. See Glenn D. West & Natalie
A. Smeltzer, Protecting the Integrity of the Entity-Specific Contract: The “No Recourse Against
Others” Clause—Missing or Ineffective Boilerplate?, 67 BUS. LAW. 39 (2011). Courts often
interpret such clauses narrowly to bar only contract claims. LaSalle National Bank v.
Perelman, 141 F. Supp. 2d 451, 459–63 (D. Del. 2001). Moreover, courts might refuse to give
such a clause effect when a veil piercing claim is premised on a shareholder’s intentional
wrongdoing. See West & Smeltzer, supra. Despite these limitations, “no recourse against
others” clauses can offer some protection against veil piercing claims. Id.
248. See supra Section I.B.2.b.
249. Bancec, 462 U.S. 611, 625–26 (1982).
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foreign state, nor controlled by the state to an extent sufficient to
make it an “organ” of the state. In that case, the entity is not an
agency or instrumentality of the foreign state and cannot assert
sovereign immunity at all.250 But even if it qualifies as an agency or
instrumentality, the entity will receive less protection.251 It will, by
definition, experience the risk of losing assets that would otherwise
have been unavailable to creditors. In this context, veil piercing
should be reserved for exceptional cases in which the decision to
respect the corporate form will enable the state to subvert the FSIA,
immunizing itself for conduct for which the statute would
otherwise impose liability.
CONCLUSION
Recognizing that sovereign states are different from other
owners of limited liability entities need not imply radical revisions
to organizational law. Still, the differences are fundamental.
Sovereign states do not need organizational law as much, or in the
same ways, as other owners. Because the law of foreign sovereign
immunity automatically confers significant owner protections,
there is an argument that courts should be more willing, rather than
less, to pierce the veil in this context. A principled veil piercing
doctrine, however, should impute an entity’s conduct and liabilities
to the sovereign only when it has used its control to defraud a
creditor or to subvert the policies embedded in the FSIA. Moreover,
courts should be less willing to pierce the veil when the entity’s
contracts include clauses, especially arbitration clauses and waivers
of sovereign immunity, that will significantly expand the
sovereign’s potential losses. If there is a need for special solicitude
in this context, it is to protect state-owned entities from creditors of
their sovereign owners. Such entities depend more heavily on
organizational law for protection, and considerations of comity and
reciprocity provide additional reason to respect their separate
legal status.

250. See supra notes 183–88 and accompanying text.
251. See supra notes 188–90 and accompanying text.
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